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Executive Summary 
The tax reform plan – A Better Way – put forward by the 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Kevin Brady and 
the Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan would be the most substantial tax 
reform in the United States since the enactment of the income tax in 
1913.  At the corporate level, the reform would allow immediate 
expensing of investments, deny deductions for net interest expense, and 
eliminate the taxation of income from sales in foreign countries while 
taxing the full value of imports (together shifting the tax base to a 
destination basis).  At the individual level, the system would tax capital 
income including interest, dividends, and capital gains at half the rate 
that wages and salaries are taxed.  It would also repeal the estate and 
generation skipping taxes.  These changes would go a long way toward 
shifting the tax system to taxing consumption rather than income. 
This paper considers the implementation of the House GOP tax 
plan and addresses issues that will need to be resolved if the plan is to 
work as intended.  The plan is based on, and builds off of, a long 
history of thinking about consumption taxes.  To understand the basic 
choices made in the plan, it is helpful to understand this history and 
how consumption taxes work in general.   
The paper provides a nutshell version of this history.  It shows 
that the plan is essentially the same as the proposal put forward by the 
tax reform panel convened by President Bush in 2005 known as the 
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Growth and Investment Tax.  That plan, in turn, was a modification of 
two similar consumption tax proposals, the Flat Tax and a closely 
related plan known as the X-tax.  And these proposals are 
modifications of the standard VAT used throughout the world.  
Understanding how VATs work and the issues they raise, as well as 
the reason for the various evolutions in the proposals allows us to 
understand the central issues that will arise in implementing the Brady 
plan.   
After summarizing this history, the paper turns to the issues 
that will need to be resolved to implement the plan, focusing on eight 
sets of issues: (i) the design of the business tax; (ii) the relative tax 
rates for corporations, partnerships, labor income, and the capital 
income of individuals; (iii) international tax issues; (iv) the taxation of 
financial instruments and institutions; (v) the taxation of corporate 
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions; (vi) deferral and the 
functioning of the individual-level tax on capital income; (vii) issues 
relating to the individual tax base such as the mortgage interest 
deduction; and (viii) problems of transition.   
Some of the problems in the current draft of the Brady plan, 
such as inconsistencies in the design of the corporate tax, are easily 
fixed.  Some problems, such as the treatment of pass-through entities 
and the taxation of major corporate transactions, can be improved 
with modest substantive changes.  Others, such as the taxation of 
financial institutions, will require substantial effort to get right, but 
approximate solutions exist.  Finally, some issues, such as the taxation 
of capital income at the individual level, will not be readily fixed.  The 
basic structure of the plan may not be workable for these issues and 
resolution of these issues might require structural changes to the plan.  
Overall, I believe that a system following the contours of the House 
GOP tax plan can be made to work, but solving the implementation 
problems will take time, effort, and compromises.    
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The tax reform plan put forth by the Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX) and the 
Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan (R-WI), if enacted, would be the most 
substantial tax reform since the original enactment of the income tax 
in 1913, far exceeding the 1986 reform.1  Known as “A Better Way,” 
the plan (which I will call the Brady plan for short) would shift the 
corporate tax from a tax on income toward a tax on consumption, from 
a worldwide system to a territorial system on what is called a 
“destination basis,” and from a system that allows a deduction for 
interest expense to a system that at least to some extent ignores 
financial flows.2  At the individual level, the plan would tax capital 
income, including interest, dividends, and capital gains, at half of the 
tax rate on wage income, greatly reducing the tax on capital.  
Combined, the changes to the corporate tax and the individual tax 
would transform the tax system, shifting strongly toward a 
consumption base and away from an income base. 
Although it would be a dramatic change from current law, the 
plan is based on a long line of academic study.  It is also based on 
numerous proposals put forward in the past including a relatively 
detailed proposal by the tax reform commission created by President 
Bush in 2005.3  And it has similarities to consumption tax systems 
currently in use elsewhere in the world.  We know a reasonable amount 
about how the system should work.   
Nevertheless, nothing quite like this has ever been tried in the 
United States or any other developed country.  It would be a massive 
break from the past.  To implement the proposal, we would have to 
resolve numerous issues, some of which are barely mentioned in the 
current description of the plan and many of which are not mentioned 
at all.   
                                                      
1 A possible rival is the addition of withholding under the income tax 
during World War II, which effectively converted the income tax from a tax on a 
small minority of wealthy individuals to a tax on most of the population.  A second 
possible rival would be the gradual expansion of the payroll tax to be the dominant 
tax paid by a large portion of the population.  
2 The most recent description of the plan can be found at A Better Way 
(June 24, 2016), http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-
PolicyPaper.pdf [perma.cc/9Z2N-NE2J]. 
3  Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM (Nov. 
2005), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-
Tax-System-2005.pdf [perma.cc/V6HP-NXPW].  
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My goal in this paper is to provide a guide to the plan, focusing 
on how the tax system would be implemented rather than the economic 
and distributional effects.4  I start by describing the broad contours of 
the plan based on what is currently publicly available.  As noted, the 
proposal is based on a long history of study of consumption taxation.  
To understand the structure and reasons for the choices made in the 
proposal, I next provide an encapsulated version of the history of 
thinking about consumption taxes, and show how the plan relates to, 
and is built off of, prior proposals.5  In particular, the Brady plan is 
essentially the same as the “Growth and Investment Plan” proposed by 
President Bush’s tax reform commission.6  That plan itself was built 
off of a prior proposal by David Bradford known as the X-tax,7 and a 
plan by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, known as the Flat Tax.8  
These plans in turn are a modifications of a VAT, which is the standard 
form of consumption taxation used by nations around the world.   
After showing how the Brady plan fits into this history, I 
examine the issues that will need to be resolved if the plan is to be 
implemented.  I focus on eight sets of issues: (i) the design of the 
business tax; (ii) the relationship between the tax rates for 
corporations, partnerships, labor income, and the capital income of 
individuals; (iii) international tax issues; (iv) the taxation of financial 
instruments and institutions; (v) the taxation of corporate transactions 
such as mergers and acquisitions; (vi) deferral and the functioning of 
the individual-level tax on capital income; (vii) issues relating to the 
                                                      
4 For additional analyses of the plan, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & 
Kimberly Clausing, Problems with Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the 
Ryan Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 229 (2017); Leonard E. Burman, James R. 
Nunns, Benjamin R. Page, Jeffrey Rohaly & Joseph Rosenberg, An Analysis of the 
House GOP Tax Plan, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 257 (2017); Elena Patel & John 
McClelland, What Would a Cash Flow Tax Look Like for U.S. Companies? 
Lessons from a Historical Panel, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF TAX 
ANALYSIS (Jan. 2017), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/WP-116.pdf [perma.cc/273T-WBH5]. 
5 The discussion is based largely on two of my prior publications on this 
topic, David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 599 
(2000), and David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L. REV. 
201–238 (2003). 
6 Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 
supra note 3.  
7 DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); David F. 
Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 TAX NOTES 
383–91 (1988). 
8 Robert Ernest Hall & Alvin Rabushka, Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax 
(1983). 
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individual tax base such as the mortgage interest deduction; and (viii) 
problems of transition. 
Some of the problems I discuss can be readily fixed, but many 
of the issues that need to be resolved are complex and defy easy 
solutions.  Some aspects of the plan may require substantial revision 
or a completely different approach to be workable.  A central problem 
with the plan is that it tries to straddle the line between an income tax 
and a consumption tax, inconsistently taking elements of both.  In 
some cases, this generates inconsistent taxation of different types of 
investments and unnecessary complexity.  In other cases, the mix is 
entirely unworkable.  Solving these problems by shifting to a pure 
consumption tax, however, would put the United States in new 
territory: no developed country has tried to have a pure consumption 
base for its tax system.   
Although there is a strong impetus to pass a tax reform plan 
quickly, finding reasonable and durable solutions to many of the issues 
will take time.  This is particularly so because consumption tax 
approaches to tax issues are very different than income tax approaches, 
and there is little expertise in the United States on how to approach 
taxes when the base is consumption.  It is easy to make mistakes by 
relying on an understanding of how income taxes work.  For example, 
deferral is one of the central problems in designing an income tax, but 
is largely irrelevant in a consumption tax.  Income tax concepts like 
basis, inventory, and capitalization of expenses no longer apply.  
Legislative drafters, experienced in income tax design, will have to 
work hard to avoid importing income tax concepts into a consumption 
tax.  Doing so quickly and, possibly, on a partisan basis if tax reform 
is passed as part of budget reconciliation, will be difficult.  
Nevertheless, I will conclude that with work, a plan following the basic 
contours of the Brady plan can be implemented and, if the right choices 
are made, may, in many areas, be substantially simpler than current 
law.   
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSAL 
The following is a summary of the proposal taken from the 
June 24, 2016 description of the plan found in the Ways & Means 
Committee website.9  The description on the website is just a rough 
outline and has many ambiguities.  It is likely that in some places my 
interpretation is incorrect.  Moreover, many elements will be changed 
as the plan is developed in more detail. 
 
                                                      
9 Supra note 2. 
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A. Business Level Tax   
Corporations.  The plan makes four key changes to the 
corporate tax:  
• The cost of capital expenditures (other than land) would be 
immediately deductible instead of recovered over time 
through depreciation deductions.   
• Net interest expense would not be deductible.  In effect, 
interest expense would be treated similarly to dividends, 
reducing the disparity between debt and equity.  Non-
deductible interest expense can be carried forward and used 
against interest income in future years.   
• The tax would be territorial, which means that it would apply 
only to income from domestic activities.  Accumulated foreign 
earnings at the time of the tax, however, would be subject to a 
one-time tax of 8.75% for cash holdings and 3.5% for other 
assets, without regard to whether they are repatriated.  This 
transition tax would be payable over an eight-year period. 
• The tax would be destination-based, which means that sales in 
foreign countries would not be taxed and imports from foreign 
countries would not be deductible (or give rise to basis).   
The plan would also eliminate most special deductions and 
credits currently allowed to corporations such as the domestic 
production deduction.  It would, however, retain a version of the R&D 
credit.  The tax on this base would be 20%.   
The plan describes these changes as moving the system 
towards what is called a cash-flow consumption tax.  In a cash-flow 
consumption tax, firms deduct outflows and include inflows rather 
than using the usual income tax concepts such as basis, realization, 
capitalization, and the like.  As will be discussed, it is a tax on 
consumption rather than income.   
There are, however, a number of statements in the plan that are 
inconsistent with cash-flow taxation.  In particular, the plan says that 
it will keep inventory accounting.  Inventory accounting would not be 
necessary in a cash-flow system because the cost of assets is deducted 
when purchased or created.  The plan also does not allow a deduction 
for purchases of land, so that expenditures on land are treated 
differently than other expenditures.  In a cash-flow system, all (non-
financial) expenditures would be deductible.   
Cash-flow consumption taxes are also usually what is called R-
based, which means that they ignore financial flows such as borrowing 
and lending.  They tax only real flows, hence the R.  An alternative is 
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what is called R+F based, which means that the system taxes all real 
and all financial flows (other than with respect to stock) on a cash-flow 
basis.10  The Brady plan, as described, is consistent with neither of 
these approaches.  In particular, it taxes net interest income but denies 
a deduction for net interest expense.  In an R-based system, interest 
income would not be taxed.  In an R+F system, interest expense (and 
the principal of loans) would be deductible.  Moreover, the plan is 
silent on other financial flows, such as gains and losses from the sale 
of securities and derivative instruments.   
It is not clear whether these deviations from an R-based cash-
flow tax are mistakes or are on purpose.  The description of the plan 
gives no explanation.  In Part IV.A., I will discuss the problems these 
deviations from an R-based cash flow system create.   
Pass-through entities.  The plan keeps the current law tax rules 
for pass-through entities.  This means that the tax rules for partnerships 
under subchapter K and for closely-held corporations under subchapter 
S would remain.  The tax base11 for these entities has the same features 
as the corporate tax base: immediate deduction for capital 
expenditures, no deduction for net interest expense, territorial taxation, 
and destination-based cash flow determination.   
Once a pass-through entity computes its tax base and allocates 
it to its owners, the owners report their amounts on their personal 
returns.  The tax rate for the active earnings of pass-through entities is 
capped at 25% which means that the applicable rate is the lesser of the 
owner’s marginal tax rate and 25%.12  Because this rate cap applies 
only to active earnings, passive income of pass-through entities (which 
is not defined) would presumably be taxed at the owner’s marginal tax 
rate, not capped at 25%. 
B.  International Tax Rules 
As mentioned, the tax would be destination based, which 
means that exports would not be taxed and imports would be subject 
to tax.  In practice, what this means is that a U.S. company that sells a 
                                                      
10 The R+F base was first described by the Meade Commission. The 
Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES (1978). 
11 Throughout, rather than using “income” I use “tax base”.  If the reform 
shifts the tax system to a consumption tax, the tax base would not be income, and it 
is misleading to say that a business computes its income on a cash-flow basis.  
Instead, I will say that a firm computes its tax base, or where grammatically 
simpler, its earnings.  
12 An alternative interpretation of the language in the plan, suggested to 
me by Steve Shay, is that pass-through income is taxed at a flat 25% rate.  It is not 
clear which interpretation is correct.  
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good in a foreign country would not include the proceeds in its tax 
base.  Conversely, a U.S. company that imports a good would not be 
able to deduct the cost of the good so that when the good is sold in the 
United States, its full value is included in its tax base and taxed (as 
opposed to just the value added in the United States). 
The plan is also territorial, which means that U.S. corporations 
are not taxed on income earned in other countries.  Because sales in 
other countries and active income earned in other countries are not 
taxed, most tax rules governing outbound transactions would be 
repealed.  The plan indicates that the foreign personal holding 
company rules would remain.   
The plan does not mention which rules governing inbound 
investments would remain.  For example, the plan does not say 
whether it would retain the withholding rules for dividend payments 
made to foreigners or the branch profits rules.  Similarly, the plan does 
not say which source rules would be retained or how they would be 
modified. 
C. Other Entities  
The plan does not say how other entities, such as banks, 
regulated investment companies, insurance companies, real estate 
investment trusts, REMICs, and other entities will be taxed.  The plan 
does not mention tax-exempt entities, and I assume that means no 
changes would be made to their treatment.  The plan does not mention 
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, although this would likely be 
reformed to match the new business tax rules. 
D. Individual Level Taxation 
To a great extent, the taxation of individuals under the plan is 
similar to their taxation under current law.  The basic intent seems to 
be to simplify the ornate structure of taxation that has built up over the 
years.   
In particular, the plan would tax wage or labor income at 
progressive rates, with three brackets, 12%, 25%, and 33%.  It would 
have a large standard deduction, in the range of $24,000 for a married 
couple, and a combined child credit and personal exemption of $1,500.  
The AMT would be repealed.  The plan does not mention payroll taxes, 
which, I assume, remain as is.   
Many of the features of the tax system for individuals found in 
current law would remain roughly as is, with unspecified 
simplifications.  For example, the plan says that it will preserve “a” 
mortgage interest deduction, and that the Committee on Ways and 
Means will evaluate options to make it more effective and efficient.  
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Similar language is used for the deduction for charitable donations, the 
exclusion for employer provided health care, the various education tax 
benefits, and the various retirement savings provisions found in current 
law.  With the exception of the mortgage interest deduction and the 
deduction for charitable donations, all itemized deductions would be 
repealed (which means that the plan would repeal the state and local 
tax deduction).  The Earned Income Tax Credit would remain.  
Presumably, the rules defining the scope of taxable compensation, 
such as the fringe benefit rules, would remain.   
The most important difference from current law for individuals 
is that all income from capital, including interest, dividends, and 
capital gains would be taxed at half the rate applicable to labor income.  
This change would reduce the highest tax rate on dividends and 
capitals from 25% (the 20% statutory rate plus the 3.8% surtax on net 
investment income plus the Pease surtax) under current law to 16.5% 
and the highest tax rate on interest income from 44.6% to 16.5% (a 
63% cut).  While business taxes are territorial, I assume that the 
individual capital income tax is not.  That is, I assume that dividends, 
interest, and capital gains, regardless of the source, would be taxed. 
E. Estate and Gift Taxation 
The plan would repeal the estate tax and the generation 
skipping taxes.  It is silent on the gift tax, which I take to mean that the 
gift tax would be retained.13  It does not mention whether it would 
retain stepped-up basis at death.   
F. Revenue and Distribution 
The description of the plan does not include a revenue estimate 
or distributional tables.  It is not clear whether estimates were used to 
arrive at the tax rates stated in the plan.  If not, the stated tax rates may 
have to change, possibly significantly, to reach appropriate targets.  In 
particular, the Tax Policy Center estimates that the plan lowers tax 
receipts by about $3.1 trillion over ten years on a static basis and $3 
trillion on a dynamic basis.14  The Tax Foundation’s static estimate is 
that the plan would lose $2.4 trillion over ten years, which is roughly 
                                                      
13 The Tax Policy Center analysis made the opposite assumption, that the 
gift tax will be repealed. See Burman et al., supra note 4 at 264.  
14 Burman et al., supra note 4, at 273 also estimate that the plan would be 
highly regressive. In its first year of operation (which they assume is 2017), the top 
0.1 percent of taxpayers would receive a tax cut of about 16.9 percent of their after-
tax income.  Households in the middle fifth of the income distribution would 
receive cuts of about 0.5 percent of their after-tax income.  The poorest fifth would 
have tax cuts of 0.4 percent.  
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in the same ballpark, although their dynamic estimate is that the plan 
would lose only $191 billion, which is effectively revenue neutral.15 
These estimates need to be taken as provisional because so 
many of the details of the plan remain unspecified.  For example, the 
plan does not state how existing basis will be treated once the corporate 
tax shifts to an expensing system.  Many of these details will have large 
effects on tax revenues and also on the distribution of the tax burden.   
The size of the tax cut and the distributional effects of the plan 
will likely be headline items in the press coverage of the plan.  The 
focus here, however, is on the structure of the proposed tax system.  
There are two reasons for this focus.  First, there has been little 
attention to structural issues, and these issues will have first order 
effects on the operation of the plan and its economic effects.  Second, 
the revenue and distributional impacts, while contentious, are, to a 
great extent, relatively easy issues to resolve by choosing appropriate 
marginal rates.  That is, there may be deep philosophical issues about 
the right degree of progressivity of the tax system and the right overall 
level of taxation, but any given resolution of those issues is relatively 
easy to implement through the choice of the rates.  The structural issues 
may be much more difficult to resolve.   
III. HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
To understand the overall structure of the Brady plan, we need 
to understand the proposals for consumption taxation that have been 
made over the last 40 years.  I offer a summary here.  More detail can 
be found in numerous sources.16 
A. Consumption Tax Basics 
                                                      
15 Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of the 2016 House Republican 
Tax Reform Plan, TAX FOUND. (July 5, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/details-and-
analysis-2016-house-republican-tax-reform-plan/ [perma.cc/88UK-5CGK]. 
16 Much of the original work was done by David Bradford, including his 
works cited in note 7, David F. Bradford, Transition to and Tax-Rate Flexibility in 
a Cash-Flow-Type Tax, 12 TAX POLICY ECON. 151–172 (1998), DAVID BRADFORD, 
THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2004), and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977), which was primarily 
authored by Bradford. Other work on implementation of consumption taxes 
includes William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a 
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575–1661 (1979); Weisbach, 
Ironing Out the Flat Tax, supra note 5; Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot?, 
supra note 5; ROBERT CARROLL AND ALAN D. VIARD, PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION 
TAXATION: THE X-TAX REVISITED (2012).  
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Individuals can do two things with their income: they can use 
it for consumption or they can save it.  Robert Haig and Henry Simons 
proposed defining income this way, according to its uses.  In their 
formulation, an individual’s income in a given period is his 
consumption plus his change in net worth or savings.   
Using this same identity, consumption is income minus 
changes in savings.  This means that we can measure consumption by 
measuring income and allowing a deduction for savings (and an 
inclusion for withdrawals from savings).   
An income tax with a deduction for savings (that is, a 
consumption tax) is simply a tax on cash flows.17  Taxpayers have 
income in a given year, say as salary or gains from investments.  This 
income is an inflow.  They subtract from this any amounts they save – 
their outflows.  They pay tax on what is left, which is their 
consumption.   
What makes this system so attractive from an administrative 
and compliance standpoint is that it does not need to use income tax 
accounting concepts such as realization, basis, depreciation, accrual, 
inventories, capitalization, and the like.  To tax consumption, we just 
need to measure inflows less outflows.  Switching to a cash-flow 
system, therefore, potentially allows substantial simplification of the 
tax rules. 
A cash-flow system allows an immediate deduction for 
savings.  Students of the tax law will remember that an immediate 
deduction of an expenditure is, with an exception discussed below, the 
equivalent of not taxing the return on the expenditure.  To illustrate, 
suppose you purchase a share of stock or a machine for $100 and it 
produces a return of $110 in one year, for a 10% rate of return.  An 
income tax would give you basis of $100, an amount realized of $110, 
and gain of $10.  At a tax rate of 20%, you would owe $2. 
A cash-flow system would allow an immediate deduction of 
the $100 purchase, saving you $20 in taxes.18  You do not have any 
basis in the asset (because you deducted its cost), so when you get the 
                                                      
17 This observation was first made by NICHOLAS KALDOR, EXPENDITURE 
TAX (1955).  Andrews, supra note 16, expanded on and developed the idea.  
18 The deduction either reduces taxes you would otherwise owe, or if you 
do not otherwise owe $20, would, in a pure cash-flow tax, be refundable.  The 
Brady plan does not refund losses.  Instead, it allows unlimited carry forwards with 
interest, which in economic terms is roughly the same thing.  In the example, you 
would carryforward the $100 loss, increasing it by $10, to have a $110 loss which 
could be used against the $110 of income.  
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$110 the next year, you have $110 of gain, and owe $22 in taxes.  But 
note that the $22 you owe next year is just the future value of the $20 
in taxes that you saved this year (at the 10% market rate of return).  In 
present value terms, you owe no tax.  In fact, if you wanted, you could 
invest the $20 tax savings at the 10% market rate of return and have 
$22 next year, so that you will have exactly enough to pay the tax.19  
In this case, the tax has no effect on you at all: you get the refund, put 
it in the bank, and take it out of the bank at a future date to pay the tax.  
Your investment is unaffected.  Therefore, in a cash-flow system, the 
investment bears no effective tax.  As the Brady plan puts it, the 
effective marginal tax rate on new investment in a cash-flow system is 
zero.   
Note that this is true regardless of the tax rate.  If the rate were, 
say, 70%, the same analysis would hold.  The deduction for the initial 
investment of $100 would be worth $70 and the tax on the return of 
$110 would be $77.  The present value of these flows is $0.  Because 
the effective marginal tax rate on new investment is zero, the nominal 
rate does not matter for new investment.   
An exception to this conclusion is if the investment produces 
higher returns than are otherwise available in the market (adjusting for 
risk).20  These returns are variously called “inframarginal returns,” 
“rents,” or “economic profits.”  To illustrate, suppose that the market 
rate of return is 10% but the investment has a yield of 20%, so that in 
one year you get back $120 instead of $110.  In the year of the 
investment, you save $20 in tax.  The next year, you have $120 in 
incoming cash flows, so you owe $24 in tax.  The amount you owe, 
$24, is $2 more than in the $22 owed in the prior case when you only 
received the market rate of return.  The additional $2 is the 20% tax on 
the $10 you earned that is above the normal market rate of return.  If 
you put your tax refund of $20 in the bank, you would have only $22 
next year.  You would have to dig into your own pocket to find the 
additional $2 that you owe. 
This analysis allows us to describe a consumption tax more 
precisely (which will end up being important in thinking about the 
structure of the Brady plan).  There are two sources of income: income 
from labor and income from saving and investing.  A consumption tax 
                                                      
19 The investment of the $20 would also be deductible, producing $4 of 
tax savings, which you could also invest.  Continuing this process, you would 
eventually be able to invest $25 in tax savings and owe $27.50, the future value of 
$25, in taxes.  
20 The other key assumption is that tax rates stay the same. The effects of 
changing tax rates are discussed in Part IV.H.  
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is the same as an income tax except that (because of its cash-flow 
structure) it exempts the normal return from savings, but not economic 
profits.  A consumption tax, therefore, can be thought of as a tax on 
labor income and economic profits.   
There is also, potentially, a third component of a consumption 
tax, which relates to transition effects.  Depending on how the 
transition is managed, a consumption tax might also fall on existing 
capital.  If we think about sources of consumption in the future, one 
major source is liquidating existing investments, and using the cash to 
purchase consumption.  For example, if you were retiring today, all or 
almost all of your future consumption would come from your existing 
investments, not from labor income or economic profits. 
The Brady plan is silent on transition, so I will defer discussion 
of this issue (including a discussion of why the transition effect can 
occur).  Because of the large existing base of capital, a tax on existing 
capital will substantially affect the overall operation of the tax, so it 
will be important to resolve the issue. 
B. The Cash-Flow or Subtraction-Method VAT 
An alternative way to tax consumption is to tax consumption 
purchases at the point of sale, a system known as a retail sales tax.21  If 
a retailer sells a widget to a consumer for $100, the consumer has $100 
of consumption.  We can simply have the retailer remit $20 of taxes to 
the government, thereby imposing a tax on the consumption of the 
widget.  And although it would not be remotely obvious from thinking 
about a retail sales tax, since it is a tax on consumption just like a cash-
flow tax is, it too is effectively a tax on labor income and economic 
profits, plus possibly existing capital depending on the transition rules.   
The problem with retail sales taxes is that they are relatively 
easy to avoid: retailers simply sell goods under the counter for cash, 
sharing the tax savings with their customers.  A VAT can be thought 
of as a retail sales tax designed to prevent fraud and to reduce the 
consequences of any fraud that remains.  The way VATs do this is by 
collecting tax at each level of production. 
To illustrate how a VAT works, we must know more about how 
the widget is produced.  Suppose that our widget is produced in two 
stages.  A manufacturer builds the widget using labor.  Its labor costs 
are $50.  The manufacturer then sells the widget to a retailer for $70.  
                                                      
21 Retail sales taxes, used in many states, tend to have narrow bases – for 
example they often exclude services – but retail sales taxes could, at least in theory, 
apply to the purchase of all consumption. 
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The retailer sells it to the customer for $100 and in doing so, incurs 




 Manufacturer Retailer 
Purchase price $0 $70 
Labor cost $50 $20 
Sales price $70 $100 
Profit $20 $10 
 
A subtraction-method VAT is a tax on the cash flow at each 
stage in production, except there is no deduction for wages and 
financial flows are ignored.  The retailer has a $100 inflow and a $70 
outflow (not counting wages), so the retailer has a VAT base of $30.  
If the rate is 20%, the retailer owes $6 in tax. 
The manufacturer has a $70 inflow and no non-wage, non-
financial outflows, so it has a VAT base of $70 and owes taxes of $14.  
Together, the manufacturer and retailer owe $20, which is the same 
amount that would be owed under a retail sales tax.  Therefore, a 
system that taxes the cash inflows of businesses and allows deductions 
for purchases of inputs from other businesses (in other words, a cash-
flow system at the business level) is equivalent to a consumption tax.  
A VAT that measures cash flows, that is, a system that allows a 
deduction for purchases and an inclusion for sales, is called a 
“subtraction method” VAT.  Table 2 summarizes the taxes imposed 
through such a system. 
 
Table 2 
Subtraction Method VAT 
 Manufacturer Retailer 
Sales $70 $100 
Less purchases $0 $70 
Net $70 $30 
Tax at 20% $14 $6 
Total tax collected  $20 
 
The key difference between a retail sales tax and a VAT is that 
if a business does not participate in the system – it refuses to pay taxes 
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and does not claim deductions – the only tax that is lost is the tax at 
that level of production.  For example, under a retail sales tax, if the 
retailer is a tax cheat and does not file tax returns, all $20 of taxes are 
foregone.  In a VAT, the government still collects taxes paid at prior 
levels, in this case $14.   
Note that the system ignores financial flows.  We said nothing 
about how the retailer or manufacturer financed their businesses, how 
much stock or debt they had, and so forth.  We simply ignored financial 
flows, which means, among other things that the businesses could not 
deduct their interest expense.  With the exception of the consumption 
of financial services, discussed below, there is no need to consider 
financial flows when measuring consumption.  Because the system 
only taxes real flows, not financial flows, it is known as an R-based 
tax.  As we will see, consumption can also be measured by including 
financial flows through a system known as an R+F-based tax. 
European VATs do not work exactly as described in the 
example.  Rather than getting a deduction for the cost of their 
purchases, purchasers get a credit against tax for any tax paid by the 
seller, under a system known as a credit invoice VAT.  As we know, 
however, credits and deductions are the same thing using different 
units.  In a 20% tax, a $20 credit is the same as a $100 deduction.  Both 
save you $20 in taxes.  Going back to the example, in a credit invoice 
VAT, the retailer would have an inflow of $100 and owe a tax of $20 
but would get a credit for the $14 of tax paid by the manufacturer, so 
it would owe $6, exactly as in the cash-flow system.  The only 
difference is that instead of deducting $70, the retailer gets a credit of 
$14; different language to describe the same thing.   
The reason European VATs use the credit invoice system is the 
invoices: the retailer gets an invoice from the manufacturer stating that 
the manufacturer paid $14 in VAT on the widget.  The retailer can only 
claim a credit for the purchase of the widget if it gets the invoice.  This 
generates an incentive for the retailer to demand that the manufacturer 
pay tax, and it creates a paper trail for audits.  It also ensures that the 
system is what I have called “closed.” 22   Purchasers only get 
deductions or credits when sellers have paid a tax on the sale.  Ensuring 
that the system is closed has important implications both for the scope 
                                                      
22 Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, supra note 5. 
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of the tax base and for enforcement.23  Subtraction method VATs 
could require invoices, but proposals for subtraction method VATs 
almost never do.   
C. Destination v. Origin Basis: The Treatment of Cross-
border Purchases and Sales 
VATs around the world are, without exception, destination-
based.  In a destination-based system, exports are exempt from tax and 
imports are taxed.   
In our example, under a destination-based system, if the retailer 
sells the widget in Canada, it would not have to include the $100 cash 
inflow.  Because it does not count its $100 inflow, it has a net outflow 
for tax purposes of $70, so it would get a $14 rebate from the 
government.  This rebate is known as a border adjustment and 
destination-based taxes are sometimes called “border adjustable” 
taxes.  The border adjustment offsets prior taxes so that there is no net 
tax on the sale in Canada.  This means that goods sold in foreign 
countries are exempt from U.S. tax. 
In the other direction, goods produced in foreign countries and 
sold in the United States are subject to tax.  For example, if the retailer 
bought the good from a Canadian manufacturer, it would not get a 
deduction for its $70 purchase price.  When it sells the widget in the 
United States for $100, the retailer is taxed on the full amount, so it 
would owe $20 in tax.  This means that the tax is the same on imported 
goods as goods produced in the United States.  In both cases, the tax is 
$20 on a good that ultimately sells for $100.   
A destination-based tax can be thought of as a tax on domestic 
consumption regardless of where goods are produced.  If a good is 
produced domestically, there is a tax on the good only if it consumed 
domestically – border adjustments remove the tax if the good is 
exported.  If a good is produced abroad, it is taxed if it is consumed 
domestically because border adjustments impose a tax when it is 
imported.   
The alternative to a destination-based system is an origin-based 
system.  In this system, domestic producers owe tax on the sale of their 
goods regardless of where the sale occurs.  In the example, there would 
be $20 of tax on the manufacture and sale of the widget even if it is 
                                                      
23 For example, in a closed system, purchases from tax-exempts or other 
non-taxpayers are not deductible while in a system that is not closed – what I 
termed “open” – these purchases are deductible. The tax base is different in the two 
cases because in a closed system, value added by non-taxpayers is eventually taxed 
(unless provided directly to individuals for consumption) while in an open system 
it is not. The Brady plan is an open system.  
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sold in Canada.  Goods produced abroad would not be taxed when sold 
here.  This would mean that the retailer in our example would be able 
to deduct the $70 costs of the widget that it imports for sale here and 
pay tax only on the $30 value added in the United States.   
An origin-based tax can be thought of as a tax on domestic 
production regardless of where the goods are sold.  Goods produced 
domestically bear a tax even if sold abroad.  Goods produced abroad 
do not bear a tax even if consumed domestically.   
A common reaction to these systems (repeated in the Brady 
plan) is that the destination-based system is better for domestic 
producers.  Under a destination-based system, both U.S. and foreign 
producers face the same tax when they sell goods in the United States.  
For sales abroad, the tax is removed allowing U.S. producers to 
compete with foreign producers.   
With an origin-based tax, goods sold by U.S. producers in a 
foreign country still bear a U.S. tax.  Foreign producers selling in their 
own country do not face a U.S. tax, seemingly giving them an 
advantage over U.S. producers.  Similarly, foreign producers selling in 
the United States would not face a U.S. tax but competing U.S. 
producers would, again seeming to give foreign producers an 
advantage.   
There is, however, a long line of literature showing that this 
initial reaction is incorrect.  Rather than repeat the arguments in the 
literature, I refer readers to the many sources that explain it in detail.24  
One intuition for the result is that in present value terms, domestic 
production (the base of an origin-based tax) and domestic consumption 
(the base of a destination-based tax) have to be equal.  You can trade 
production today for consumption in the future (generating a trade 
surplus) or vice versa (generating a trade deficit) but in present value 
terms, trade has to balance.  You can only consume what you have 
produced.   
                                                      
24 The literature on this issue is extensive, including, for example, Martin 
S. Feldstein & Paul R. Krugman, International trade effects of value-added 
taxation, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 263–282 (1990). For a recent 
accessible discussion, see ALAN J. AUERBACH & DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, THE 
ROLE OF BORDER ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, AMERICAN ACTION 
FORUM RESEARCH PAPER (2016).  Note that the comparison in the text is between 
destination-based and origin-based consumption taxes.  The U.S. currently has a 
source-based income tax.  Eliminating the current source-based tax, as proposed in 
the Brady plan, would very likely affect location decisions.  
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Rather than through trade balance, the equivalence is usually 
explained in terms of price effects, which, with floating currencies, can 
be achieved by a change in the relative price of the currency.  A 
destination-based tax increases demand abroad for U.S. goods, 
strengthening the dollar, which then offsets any apparent advantage for 
U.S. producers.25  With a 20% tax rate, the dollar would increase by 
25% so that an imported good that previously cost $100 now costs $80.   
                                                      
25 Michael Graetz gives the following illustration, taken from Al Warren:  
Suppose that the U.S. has an origin-based VAT of 10 percent with no 
border adjustments, and that a U.S. consumer product which costs $100 to produce 
will sell for $110, including the tax, whether sold in the U.S. or for export.  Assume 
that a comparable product is produced in country Z and sells for 110Z in the local 
zed currency.  Assume further that the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and 
the Z zed is $1 = 1Z.  Finally, for simplicity assume that there are no transportation 
costs for shipping the products. 
Under these conditions, consumers in the U.S. and Z will choose between 
the two products on the assumption that they will sell for identical prices.  
Consumers in Z have the choice of buying the Z product for 110Z or buying the 
U.S. product for $110, which will require 110Z.  Similarly, the U.S. consumers can 
buy either product for $110.  A U.S. producer has the choice of selling in the U.S. 
market for $110 or exporting for 110Z, which will yield $110. In either case, the 
U.S. product will retain $100 after payment of taxes. 
What will happen if the U.S. replaces its origin based VAT with a 
destination-based VAT that exempts exports and taxes imports?  Initially, the Z 
product appears more expensive to U.S. consumers than the U.S. product because 
the Z product will sell for $121 (the old price of $110 plus the new 10 percent tax) 
whereas the U.S. will still sell for $110. Similarly, the U.S. product now looks less 
expensive than the Z product to country Z consumers, because the tax rebate means 
that the U.S. product can now be exported from the U.S. for $100. The U.S. 
producer might therefore think it has an advantage in Z, where the comparable 
local product continues to sell for 110Z.  Hence it is often argued that a destination-
based VAT would stimulate exports and that an origin-based VAT would not. 
Now consider what happens when the U.S. and Z consumers start to 
switch from Z products to U.S. products because the latter appear less expensive.  
That switch would mean that there would be less demand for the Z currency by 
U.S. nationals (who are reducing their imports of the Z products) and more demand 
for the U.S. currency by Z nationals (who are increasing their imports of the U.S. 
product).  Given this change in demand, the value of the dollar will rise relative to 
the zed until there is no longer any advantage to switching from Z products to U.S. 
products, given consumer’s preferences relating to matters other than price, which 
preferences are independent of the tax law.  In this simple example, the value of the 
dollar would rise until $1 could be exchanged for 1.1Z. 
U.S. consumers would then have the choice between buying the U.S. 
product for $110 (including the tax) or the Z product for $100 (which would be 
exchanged for 110Z) plus the 10 percent tax on imports, for a total of $110.  Z 
consumers would have the choice between buying the Z product for 110Z or the 
U.S. product for $100, which would require 110Z.  Similarly, U.S. producers 
would be indifferent between selling in Z or domestically. 
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Currency effects, however, do not offset all of the differences 
between origin and destination-based taxes.  In particular, to the extent 
that there are inframarginal returns, the two are not equal.  Again, I 
will leave the details to others, but destination-based systems tax any 
economic profits U.S. consumers earn from investments abroad (even 
if made through a domestic multinational corporation) and exempt 
economic profits that foreign consumers earn in the United States.  
Origin-based taxes are the reverse: they tax U.S. economic profits of 
foreign producers and exempt foreign economic profits of U.S. 
producers.26   
The equivalence between destination and origin-based taxes 
(other than for economic profits) is an article of faith for economists, 
and, as far as I can tell, believed by nobody else.  The Brady plan, for 
example, argues that border adjustments will help U.S. businesses 
compete with foreign businesses.  Even if you believe that the 
destination and origin-based systems have the same economic effects, 
however, there may be good reasons to prefer one over the other 
because they have different administrative and compliance effects.  In 
                                                      
Taking into account the change in exchange rates brought about by the 
change in the relative prices of the U.S. and Z products due to the introduction of 
border adjustments, the destination-based VAT has no advantage over the origin-
based VAT in terms of stimulating exports.  One of the U.S. products exchanges 
for one of the Z products in both the U.S. and country Z under both taxes, and the 
U.S. producer earns the same amount from a sale at home and a sale abroad under 
either tax. 
Michael Graetz, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Restructuring: 
Practice or Principle?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1093–1247 (1997). 
26 One intuition for this result is to think of a destination-based system as a 
cash-flow system for outbound investment.  The border adjustments acts like a 
deduction for flows out of the country and a tax for flows into the country.  A cash 
flow tax will impose a present value tax for inframarginal returns received abroad 
because the present value of the tax on the inflow will exceed the tax rebate on the 
outflow.  Origin-based taxes do not give the deduction on outflows and do not tax 
inflows so they do not tax inframarginal returns by U.S. consumers.  The argument 
is reversed for inbound investment.  
Although this paper focuses on implementation issues rather than revenue, 
distributional, or efficiency effects, it is worth noting that the two systems do not 
raise the same revenue if a nation imposes a consumption tax when it is either a net 
creditor or a net debtor.  To the extent that a nation is a net debtor, it expects to 
export more in the future than it imports, which means that in present value terms, 
the origin base is larger than the destination base.  In budgetary terms, which only 
look at a 10-year window and which do not use present values, however, a 
destination base may raise more money than an origin base, depending on the trade 
deficit or surplus during the budget window.  For example, if the United States 
expects to run a trade deficit during the budget window, a destination-based tax 
will raise more revenue in that window.  
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particular, many prefer a destination-based system because it 
eliminates the problem of transfer pricing.   
To illustrate why destination-based systems do not face 
transfer pricing problems, consider again our running example of a 
manufacturer and retailer but suppose, now, that the retailer is a foreign 
entity (so it does not bear U.S. tax).  Under a destination-based tax, 
any foreign sales are excluded.  Because the retailer is foreign, when 
the manufacturer sells to the retailer, the sale is not taxed.  The price, 
therefore, has no effect on the manufacturer’s taxes.  The manufacturer 
pays the same tax on the sale ($0) if the price is $0, the price is $70, or 
is any other value.   
Under an origin-based tax, the manufacturer pays tax on its sale 
to the foreign retailer because sales abroad are taxed.  The price, 
therefore, determines how much tax the manufacturer pays.  It matters 
whether the price is $0 or the price is $70.  If the manufacturer and 
retailer are not related, we can rely on the $70 price to be the true price.  
If the manufacturer and retailer are under common control, however, 
there may be an incentive to understate the price of the good when sold 
to the retailer to reduce U.S. taxation.  If the price is $70, the 
manufacturer has a VAT base of $70 while if the price is $0, its base 
is $0.  (The foreign retailer would have a correspondingly higher VAT 
base but it is not taxed by the United States because it is foreign.)  
Therefore, origin-based systems require transfer pricing rules 
while destination-based systems do not.  Eliminating transfer pricing 
disputes and the accompanying the massive enforcement resources is 
a major advantage of a destination-based tax, and the core reason why 
many recent proposals have been destination-based.   
D. The Flat Tax and the X-tax 
Destination-based VATs are used through-out the developed 
world.  We know how they work and how to implement them.  If the 
United States were to adopt a destination-based VAT, there would be 
few new implementation problems.  We could simply pick from the 
best practices used in other countries. 
The problem with VATs, however, is that they are regressive.  
There are a number of different ways we can measure the progressivity 
of a tax system.  The most common way is taxes paid relative to 
income: we look at the tax paid as a fraction of income at each level of 
income.  VATs are regressive when measured this way because the 
rich consume a lower percentage of their income than the middle-class 
or the poor so that tax as a percentage of income goes down as income 
goes up.  More generally, because VATs are imposed at the business 
level, they cannot easily be sensitive to the circumstances of individual 
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taxpayers, which means that there is no easy way to make a VAT 
progressive.   
The so-called Flat Tax and the X-tax modify the VAT to 
reduce, and possibly eliminate, this problem.  These systems allow 
business to deduct wages and salaries, and tax wages and salaries to 
individuals.  Because individuals are taxed on their labor income, the 
tax rate can be based on each individual’s or family’s level of income 
(and other attributes such as mortgage and education payments, 
retirement savings, and charitable donations).  They allow 
personalization of the tax and allow the tax to be progressive.  (The 
Flat Tax, for reasons that are unclear other than to have a rhyming 
name, would limit the number of tax brackets to two.  The X-tax allows 
the number of tax brackets to be whatever number is needed.  Because 
it is the more general of the two, I will below refer to this system as 
the X-tax.) 
Recall that a consumption tax is a tax on labor earnings and 
economic profits (and as discussed in Part IV.H., possibly existing 
capital on transition).  If labor earnings under the X-tax are taxed at 
the individual level, the business tax is a tax only on economic profits 
and possibly existing capital on transition.  That is, we can think of the 
X-tax as an individual-level wage tax and a business-level tax on 
economic profits and, possibly existing capital.   
The usual structure of X-tax proposals is to set the business-
level tax rate to be the same as the highest wage tax rate (which is not 
what the Brady plan does).  For example, if the individual wage tax 
rates were 12%, 25%, and 33%, as in the Brady plan, the business tax 
rate would be set at 33%.  The reason is that this eliminates the 
incentive for high wage earners to take their labor earnings out of the 
business as profits rather than salary.   
To illustrate, consider the retailer in our running example and 
suppose that the owner is the only employee.  The retailer has $30 of 
total proceeds and the owner/worker’s fair wages are $20.  If both the 
retailer and the owner/worker are taxed at 20%, it does not matter 
whether the earnings are paid as salary or not.  Either way, there is a 
20% tax on $30.  If, however, the tax rate on wages and salaries was 
33%, any amounts paid as salary would face this higher rate while 
amounts treated as business profits would face only a 20% rate.  There 
would be an incentive to avoid paying salaries, and directing the funds 
to workers in other ways, such as through dividends on shares that they 
own.   
 
 
2017] A GUIDE TO THE GOP TAX PLAN 193 
 
 
E. Destination-based X-tax 
The original proposal for the X-tax was origin-based.  The 
reason seems to be that the shift of the wage portion of the base from 
the business level to the individual level changes how the WTO 
classifies the tax and, therefore, the legality of using a border 
adjustment.  As will be discussed below, under WTO law, it may be 
illegal to have border adjustments in an X-tax for reasons relating to 
how the tax is classified.  WTO law only allows border adjustments 
for “indirect” taxes, which are taxes on businesses.  Because the X-tax 
imposes the wage portion of the tax directly on individuals, it may be 
classified as “direct” tax, and, therefore, may not be border adjusted 
under the WTO.  Given that destination and origin-based taxes have 
the same effect on new investment, WTO rules might seem to have no 
economic effect, requiring one approach and disallowing another, both 
of which end up in the same place.  Therefore, given possible WTO 
problems, it seemed to make sense to make the X-tax origin-based.   
As noted, however, origin-based taxes have transfer pricing 
problems not faced by destination-based taxes.27  Destination based 
systems will, as a result, be easier to administer.  Moreover, as will be 
shown below, the distinction made by the WTO is non-economic.  The 
X-tax base is the same as the VAT base, so it seems ridiculous to allow 
border adjustments only for a VAT.  And many countries have VATs 
combined with wage subsidies, so the progressive portion of the wage 
tax that we find in an X-tax but not a VAT should not change the 
analysis.  Why should the United States be forced by a treaty designed 
to promote trade into a tax system that is more difficult to administer 
and that has no trade advantages merely because it wants to make the 
tax progressive?  
Based on these considerations, some believe that the WTO 
would not in fact hold that imposing border adjustments in an X-tax is 
illegal.  While this may be wishful thinking – legal systems rarely feel 
a compulsion to follow economic logic – many believe that if the 
United States were to adopt a cash-flow system, it should be on a 
destination basis because of the substantial administrative advantages 
of using a destination base rather than an origin base.   
Since the early 2000’s, a number of proposals have followed 
this logic.  For example, the Bush tax reform commission studied a 
                                                      
27 For additional administrative problems raised by the Flat Tax, see 
Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, supra note 5. 
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destination-based X-tax. 28   Although they ultimately did not 
recommend this system – they favored a system much closer to the 
Brady plan – they included an extensive discussion of a destination-
based X-tax, showing that it could be revenue and distributionally 
neutral.  Moreover, they ultimately recommended a destination-based 
system very close to the Brady plan.  Similarly a very large study of 
tax reform in the U.K., known as the Mirrlees Review carefully studied 
a destination-based X-tax, and the chapter on the design of corporate 
taxation recommended this system (although the Review as a whole 
recommended an origin-based system known as an ACE, which has 
effects but operates differently than the X-tax).29  
F. The Growth and Investment Tax Plan 
The last step toward the Brady plan is the proposal put forth by 
the Bush Tax Reform Commission called the Growth and Investment 
Tax Plan.30  This plan is a destination-based X-tax with the addition of 
a flat 15% tax rate on interest, dividends, and capital gains at the 
individual level.31  
                                                      
28 THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, supra 
note 3. The first proposal for this system seems to be STEPHEN ROY BOND & 
MICHAEL DEVEREUX, CASH FLOW TAXES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY (2002), 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cprceprdp/3401.htm (last visited Dec 22, 2016).  
Note that the terminology can get confusing because different taxes are often given 
the same label.  In particular, many different systems are called a “destination-
based cash-flow tax.” This description could include a cash-flow VAT (i.e., with no 
deduction for wages or salaries, ignoring cash flows on financial instruments), an 
X-tax (i.e., a cash-flow VAT with a deduction for wages and salaries) and what I 
will call an R+F cash flow tax.  
29 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing 
Corporate Income, in MIRRLEES REVIEW, REFORMING THE TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (2008); JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX BY DESIGN (2011).  Other 
studies include Michael P. Devereux & Peter Birch Sørensen, The Corporate 
Income Tax: International Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform, EUR. 
COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication530_en.pdf 
[perma.cc/WSG7-JJ74]; Michael Devereux, Issues in the Design of Taxes on 
Corporate Profit, 65 NATL. TAX J. 709–30 (2012); Michael Devereux, Rita De La 
Feria et al., Designing and Implementing a Destination-Based Corporate Tax, 
(Oxford U. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper No. 14/07, 2014); ALAN J. 
AUERBACH, A MODERN CORPORATE TAX (2010); Alan J. Auerbach & Michael P. 
Devereux, Consumption and Cash-flow Taxes in an International Setting (NBER 
Working Paper No. 19579, 2013). 
30 THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, supra 
note 3. 
31 As noted, the plan also includes a benefit for mortgage interest and the 
purchase of health care, retirement savings provisions, and a deduction for 
charitable donations.  None of these are in the basic versions of the X-tax. 
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Although the reasons for this addition to the destination-based 
X-tax are not made explicit, it seems that the panel members were 
concerned about appearances.  They showed in their study of the X-
tax that, properly structured, the X-tax can be revenue and 
distributionally neutral.  Nevertheless, even if it is distributionally 
neutral, it would still allow the very wealthy to pay few, if any, explicit 
taxes to the government.  Someone who lived purely off an inheritance 
would receive no wage income and, therefore, would not have to remit 
any taxes.  While such a person would bear taxes because taxes would 
be embedded in the price of goods that he purchased and because he 
may bear a large transition tax, many might view this result as 
unseemly, particularly in light of concerns about the growth of 
inequality.   
As we will see when considering the implementation of the 
Brady plan, it will be difficult to make the combination of an X-tax 
and a flat rate tax on capital at the individual level work.  A tax on 
capital income has to tax the current return to investments.  Current 
law allows some deferral because it waits to impose tax until income 
has been realized, but it also has a large number of provisions designed 
to limit deferral.   
One of the most important anti-deferral mechanisms in current 
law is the corporate income tax.  If an individual buys stock, he is not 
taxed until dividends are paid or he sells the stock, creating the 
potential for deferral.  The corporate income tax, however, taxes the 
current returns to the investment, thereby reducing or eliminating the 
deferral.  If businesses are taxed on a cash-flow basis, they allow 
deferral by design: because businesses deduct the cost of investments, 
the returns to investment are not taxed.  Keeping money in a business, 
therefore, gives indefinite deferral.  The mere purchase of a share of 
stock becomes a tax shelter.   
G. The Brady Plan 
At this point, the connection to the Brady plan should be clear: 
the Brady plan is the Growth and Investment Tax Plan with minor 
modifications (plus, as was mentioned, there are some statements in 
the Brady plan which are inconsistent with this approach but it is not 
clear what to make of them).  It is time, therefore, to consider the 
implementation of the Brady plan.   
IV. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS WITH THE BRADY PLAN 
The discussion above shows that the Brady plan is based on a 
long history of thought and research on consumption taxes.  Even the 
purest of these systems has a number of problems, however.  
Moreover, parts of the Brady plan seem potentially inconsistent with 
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these systems, and most if not all of these inconsistencies generate yet 
additional problems.  In the sections that follow, I discuss the eight 
most central implementation problems that I see in the Brady plan.  
There are likely many other issues that will also have to be resolved as 
the legislation moves forward. 
A. Design of the Business Tax 
As noted, there are a number of statements in the description 
of the business-level tax that seem inconsistent with the basic structure 
of an R-based cash-flow tax.  If these statements are inadvertent, they 
should be fixed.  If they are not inadvertent, for the most part they are 
bad choices and should be reconsidered.   
Inconsistent expensing 
There are a number of statements that indicate that the plan 
would not truly be a cash-flow tax.  The two most prominent are (1) 
the explicit statement that purchases of land would not be expensed 
and (2) the statement that the LIFO inventory method would be 
retained. 
In a cash-flow system, all non-financial outflows are 
deductible, including purchases of land and purchases of inventory.  It 
makes no sense to deny deductions for purchase of land and of 
inventory while allowing a deduction for the purchase of other capital 
items.  If some purchases are taxed on a cash-flow basis and others are 
taxed on a traditional income tax basis, the effective tax rate on 
different types of investments will be different.  For example, if land 
is taxed on a traditional income tax basis but machines and buildings 
are taxed on a cash-flow basis, the effective tax rate on land will be 
higher than on machines or buildings.  This will distort investment 
patterns and make the tax less efficient.   
Moreover, even if there were a reason for introducing this 
distortion into the system, it would make the system more complex.  
One of the great virtues of a cash-flow system is its simplicity.  
Businesses do not need to use complex income tax accounting systems 
such as LIFO, FIFO, capitalization rules, or accrual concepts like 
economic performance.  Instead, for tax purposes, businesses just 
deduct cash outlays and include cash inflows.  Retaining income tax 
treatment for some investments means retaining most and possibly all 
of the income tax accounting rules, foregoing one of the major benefits 
of a cash-flow system.32  Moreover, it requires rules to distinguish 
investments in land from related investments: taxpayers making a joint 
                                                      
32 Businesses, however, would likely have to continue to use income 
accounting for book purposes.  
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purchase of land and improvements have an incentive to allocate the 
purchase price to the improvements (while sellers would be 
indifferent).   
Although the statements about inventory accounting and the 
treatment of land are explicit, in other parts of the plan, the corporate 
tax is described as a cash-flow tax.  I cannot think of a reason for 
keeping land and inventory on a traditional income tax system while 
putting machines and other capital expenses on a cash-flow system.33  
Therefore, I take these statements to be mistakes, and they should be 
fixed. 
An alternative reading of the plan is that it is, like current law, 
a hybrid income-consumption tax system, only shifted more toward 
the consumption end of the spectrum.  The plan might be read as 
allowing (very) accelerated depreciation and as making an attempt to 
equalize the treatment of debt and equity.  The tax would, for the most 
part, be an income tax, and the implementation issues with a corporate 
income tax are well-known.  Note, however, that if the plan is to keep 
the corporate tax as an income tax, it is extremely unlikely that the tax 
could be destination-based because it would almost surely be 
inconsistent with the WTO. 
Given the various descriptions in the plan as a cash-flow tax 
and the centrality of border adjustments to the plan, in the remainder 
of the paper, I will assume that the plan would impose a cash-flow tax 
on corporations.  If instead, the plan merely is an income tax with 
(very) accelerated depreciation for depreciable investments, most of 
current law would remain.   
Inconsistent treatment of financial instruments 
Separately, there are a number of statements in the plan that 
indicate that the business-tax portion of the system might not fully 
ignore financial flows.  The draft plan states that net interest expense 
is not deductible and that any nondeductible interest expense may be 
carried forward to be used against interest income in a future year.  
That combined with nothing in the plan indicating that interest and 
other financial income, such as dividends, gains (and losses) on 
derivative financial instruments and gains from the sale of stock are 
exempt creates a strong inference that financial income is taxed.  
Moreover, it does not seem that financial income is taxed on a cash-
                                                      
33 My only guess as to the reason for the apparent treatment of land and 
inventory is that the drafters of the Brady plan viewed expensing as simply 
accelerated depreciation so that only purchases that were otherwise depreciable 
would get expensing.  This is not the right way to view expensing in a cash-flow 
system.  Instead, all non-financial cash flows should be deductible.  
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flow basis, so it seems that financial income is taxed under the usual 
income tax rules. 
This approach generates a host of problems.  Earnings on 
financial investments would be taxed on an income basis while 
earnings on physical or intangible investments are taxed on a 
consumption basis.  For example, if you invest $100 in a machine that 
produces $110 in one year, the $10 return is effectively untaxed, as 
discussed above.  If instead you lend the $100 to someone who invests 
it in the machine and who then pays you $10 of interest in one year, 
the $10 is taxed.34  The tax base is income when transactions are 
financed through lending, and the tax base is cash-flow when done 
directly.  There seems to be no reason for disparity, and it may 
significantly distort how investments are structured.   
Denying deductions for net interest expense while taxing net 
interest income may also generate problems, particularly for firms that 
have loans between subsidiaries.  If internal capital structures are set 
up so that interest income exceeds interest expense, the firm would 
have a tax on purely internal flows.  For example, suppose a parent 
firm is capitalized with $50 of equity and $50 of debt, with the debt 
instrument paying a 10% rate of return.  The parent capitalizes its 
subsidiary with, say, $30 of equity and $70 of debt for good business 
reasons.  If the subsidiary’s debt also pays an interest rate of 10%, the 
parent would have, $2 more interest income than interest expense, and 
would owe tax on this amount.  Consolidated filing may reduce this 
problem somewhat, but not all capital structures allow consolidation 
of all subsidiaries, so the problem will inevitably remain.  Under 
current law, corporations are allowed dividends received deduction to 
eliminate this cascading.  There is no indication in the plan, however, 
that there would be a corresponding interest received deduction.   
Moreover, denying deductions for interest expense but not 
expenses and losses on other financial instruments creates 
administrative complexity and incentives to use other financial 
instruments rather than debt.  For example, lease payments will be 
deductible but equivalent interest payments will not be, creating 
incentives to lease rather than to own.  Similar problems will arise with 
respect to swaps, futures and forward contracts which have embedded 
time-value of money aspects.  To some extent current law faces this 
                                                      
34 Note that the borrower’s investment in the machine would be taxed on a 
cash-flow, so it is effectively untaxed.  The borrower would also be denied a 
deduction for its interest expense.  The borrower, in present value terms, therefore, 
bears no tax and has no deductible expenses.  The only net tax on the transaction is 
the lender’s interest income.  
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problem, and the response is a host of complex rules designed to 
classify payments as interest or not.  All of these rules and likely many 
more would be needed under the approach of the Brady plan because 
the disparity between interest expense and other expenses will be much 
more significant than under current law.   
Finally, the taxation of financial flows on an income tax basis 
is incredibly complex.  The current rules for taxing financial 
instruments are among the most complex and difficult to understand 
sets of rules in current law.  These rules would have to be retained if 
financial instruments continue to be taxed on an income-tax basis.   
The plan should take an approach to financial flows that is 
consistent with the consumption tax approach otherwise used in the 
plan.  The standard approach in cash-flow systems is to ignore 
financial flows.  This generates some problems with respect to the 
taxation of banks and other financial institutions but otherwise works 
reasonably well in a large number of tax systems used throughout the 
world.  (I defer the discussion of the taxation of financial institutions 
to Part IV.D.)  
Pass-throughs 
The Brady plan would retain the pass-through regimes of 
current law but tax active income of pass-throughs at a maximum rate 
of 25%.  It is a mistake to retain the pass-through regimes of current 
law and, with perhaps an exception for small, sole proprietorships, they 
should be repealed.  Instead, all businesses should be taxed the same 
way.  Doing so reduces economic distortions and, simultaneously, 
would simplify the law.   
To see why, compare the taxation under the Brady plan of 
equivalent investments made, alternatively, through a corporation and 
through a partnership.  Suppose that an individual has $100 and can 
purchase a machine or other asset that costs $100 and returns $110 in 
one year.  If the individual makes the investment through a 
corporation, the corporation deducts the $100 and includes the $110 
and pays no present value tax.  When the $110 is distributed, the owner 
has a $10 dividend and a $100 return of capital,35  and pays a $1.65 tax 
on the dividend.   
Suppose instead that the individual makes the same investment 
through a partnership.  In this case, the cash flows are attributed to the 
individual via the normal partnership allocation rules.  The individual 
                                                      
35 See Part IV.E. for a discussion of the determination of which portion of 
a distribution is a dividend and which is a return of capital when corporations are 
taxed under a cash-flow system.  
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deducts and includes the $100 expense and $110 return at a 25% rate 
and bears no present value tax.  There is no separate tax on 
distributions from the partnership.   
The net result is that the Brady plan would retain the current 
law system in which investments in corporations are taxed at a higher 
rate than identical investments in partnerships and other pass-through 
entities.  It creates an incentive to avoid using the corporate form.   
That current law favors partnerships over corporations is a flaw 
not a feature to be retained.  The distortions in investment patterns 
because of the preference for partnerships over corporations in current 
law is one of the reasons for the numerous proposals for corporate 
integration.  Among other things, these proposals seek to reduce the 
distinction between the taxation of partnership investments and 
corporate investments under our current income tax.36  The benefits of 
reducing the differences in taxation between different business entities 
would similarly arise under the Brady plan.   
Most corporate integration proposals, however, would retain 
the current system of having separate regimes for partnerships and 
corporations rather than unifying them in a single business tax regime.  
Although often not clear exactly why this approach is favored, it seems 
to be that the partnership regime is thought to be superior in theory but 
too complex to apply in the large, publicly traded corporation context.  
The partnership system is superior because it taxes partnership income 
at the owner’s rates while even the most sophisticated corporate 
integration systems can only approximate this.   
With the exception of inframarginal returns, the pass-through 
system under the Brady plan does not achieve this goal (and even for 
inframarginal returns, it does not get it exactly right).37  Regardless of 
the investor’s marginal tax rate on capital income, partnership flows 
(other than inframarginal returns) are taxed at a zero rate while other 
capital income of the owner is taxed at a positive rate.  A pass-through 
regime under the Brady plan fails the basic reason for having a pass 
through regime.   
                                                      
36 For example, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Integration of the Individual 
and Corporate Tax Systems, Taxing Business Income Once (1992); and A.L.I., 
Federal Income Tax Project: Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income 
Taxes, Reporter’s Study of Corporate Tax Integration (1993). 
37 Inframarginal returns of a partnership will be taxed at the lesser of the 
partner’s rate and 25%. For partners whose tax rate is below 25% (such as tax-
exempt investors), the partnership regime taxes them at that rate. For partners 
whose rate is above 25%, the partnership regime does not tax inframarginal returns 
at their tax rate.  
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At the same time that they fail to achieve their only plausible 
economic goal, pass-through regimes introduce significant 
complexity.  Retaining the pass-through system means retaining the 
baroque rules of subchapter K, the rules for subchapter S, and adding 
additional rules to distinguish active earnings of a pass-through 
(eligible for the 25% rate) and passive earnings of a pass-through (not 
eligible for the 25% rate).   
The solution is to repeal the pass-through regimes and to have 
a business tax regime which applies to all business operations.  All 
business returns would be taxed the same way: normal returns would 
be taxed at a 0% rate at the business level and the shareholder’s rate 
when distributed; inframarginal returns would be taxed at a 20% rate 
and the shareholder’s rate when distributed.  There would be no need 
for the complex partnership tax rules or for other types of separate 
systems.38  
The only exception is that it may be desirable to have a simple 
pass-through system for small, informal businesses such as sole 
proprietorships.  If I am otherwise a wage earner but cut some lawns 
on the side for extra money, at what point does my lawn mowing 
business have to be treated as a separate business? A simplified regime 
for small, closely-held businesses (i.e., one owner or maybe family 
ownership) would allow small business owners to report earnings on 
their personal return rather than having to file a separate return.   
Losses 
The Brady plan allows net operating losses to be carried 
forward with interest.  If the interest rate used for loss carryforwards 
is equal to the market rate, this system will have the same present value 
effect as refundability, but perhaps with a lower potential for fraud.   
One problem with this approach is that businesses that 
consistently have tax losses (but have economic gains) will not be able 
to use their losses, possibly indefinitely.  For example, corporations 
that produce in the United States but sell abroad will consistently have 
tax losses because foreign sales are not taxed but their production 
expenses are deductible.  They can be wildly profitable but still have 
legitimate tax losses under a destination-based system. 
                                                      
38 The only argument I can think of for retaining the partnership and other 
pass-through regimes (other than for small, sole proprietorships) is to tax 
inframarginal returns of low-bracket investors like tax-exempt entities, at a low 
rate.  This does not seem compelling because these returns are, by definition, 
above-market returns.  Moreover, even if it were a desirable goal, it would have to 
be weighed against the considerations in the text. 
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To illustrate, consider the retailer in our running example.  It 
purchases the widget for $70, incurs $20 of labor costs, and sells the 
widget for $100, making a $10 profit.  Suppose that it sells the widget 
in Canada.  Because the sale is foreign, the $100 sales proceeds would 
not be taxed.  The retailer would have a $70 deductible expense for the 
widget,39 and a $20 wage deduction, but no income.  It would have a 
$90 loss that it cannot use.  If its business model is to sell widgets in 
Canada, it will never have taxable receipts to use against this loss.   
VATs are typically refundable, which means that if a 
corporation has net losses, the government makes a cash payment to 
the corporation equal to the tax rate multiplied by the loss (20% of $90 
or $18 in our example).  VATs can do this in part because they use an 
invoice system to track tax payments.  The invoice system makes it 
more difficult to claim a loss without actually incurring one because 
the taxpayers cannot claim credits (the equivalent of a deduction in a 
cash-flow system) unless they have an invoice showing taxes were 
paid by their suppliers.  That invoice allows the government to audit 
the suppliers.  Fraud is not impossible in this system – there is a 
business of creating fraudulent invoices – but it is more difficult.   
X-tax type plans, including the Brady plan, tend not to use the 
invoice system used in VATs which means that refundability is more 
difficult to administer.  The likelihood of fraud may be too high to 
allow refunds for losses.40  
A recent Treasury study tried to estimate the extent to which 
firms in a cash flow tax would have losses that they cannot use for long 
periods of time.41  They looked at firms in the ten-year period from 
2004-2013.  Those firms under the income tax had unused losses equal 
to 18% of the corporate base.  (The percentage is high because the 
period includes the Great Recession.)  Had those firms been taxed 
during the same period under a destination-based cash-flow tax, 
unused losses would have been approximately 24% of tax base.  
Unused losses go up by about one-third.   
To the extent that losses cannot be used, the tax system will 
distort corporate ownership patterns, creating incentives for non-
economic conglomeration.  That is, combining an exporting (or other 
loss producing business) with a business that has net receipts will allow 
                                                      
39 Assuming the treatment of inventory purchases is fixed.  
40 For example, CARROLL AND VIARD, supra note 16, at 78–80, argue that 
without invoices, an X-tax should not allow refunds.  
41 Patel & McClelland, supra note 4. 
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the losses to be used against those receipts.  Profit-making businesses 
with large, unused tax losses will become takeover targets. 
One possible, although limited change that might reduce the 
problem is to allow losses to be carried back as well as forward.  
Another is to expand the rules for consolidation, by, for example, 
allowing firms to consolidate with a greater than 50% ownership 
interest rather than an 80% interest.42  Broader consolidation will make 
it easier for companies generating gains to consolidate with companies 
generating losses so that the losses can be used.  Yet another is to allow 
losses to be used against payroll tax liability.  If these changes are 
insufficient and there are a substantial number of businesses that 
consistently generate losses, an invoice system like that used in credit-
invoice VATs should be considered so that losses can be refunded.43  
B. Tax Rates 
Tax rates are of central importance in any tax system.  They 
effect the total revenue raised, the distributional and efficiency effects 
of the tax system, and tax administration.  Estimating the total revenue 
raised and the distributional impacts requires a large model, and I leave 
that to others.  I will focus here on the efficiency considerations for 
setting the corporate rate and how the corporate rate and individual tax 
rates relate to one other.   
A headline of the Brady plan is that the corporate rate is 
reduced from 35% to 20%.  Lowering the corporate tax rate is thought 
to be desirable because the U.S. corporate rate is among the highest in 
the world.  U.S. businesses are thought to be at a disadvantage relative 
to competitors due to this rate, and the recent spate of inversions is 
possibly in response to the high U.S. corporate tax rate.  There is broad 
support for lowering the corporate tax rate, and the Brady plan fulfills 
this need, in spades. 
One of the reasons for adopting a destination-based cash-flow 
consumption tax, however, is that it eliminates the need to lower 
corporate tax rates in response to international competition.44  The 
reason is that the tax base is domestic consumption.  The tax rate does 
not affect the location of production, where corporations make their 
home, or where profits are located, because regardless of these choices, 
the tax is the same.  It depends only on where consumption takes place.  
The central reason for a lower corporate tax rate is solved in the Brady 
                                                      
42 CARROLL AND VIARD, supra note 16, at 79. 
43 Invoice systems have a number of other important features that are 
explored in Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, supra note 5. 
44 For additional detail, see AUERBACH AND DEVEREUX, supra note 29.  
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plan by structural changes.  There is, therefore, no reason to lower the 
tax rate to prevent corporations from relocating or because U.S. 
corporations face international competition from lower-taxed 
companies.45 
Another, independent, reason for lowering corporate tax rates 
is to encourage investment.  Leaving aside international 
competitiveness (i.e., suppose the United States were a closed 
economy so that only domestic investment mattered), high tax rates on 
corporate income may make many otherwise profitable investments 
unwise.  Lowering the corporate income tax rate improves the 
efficiency of corporate investments.   
While this argument might be important in an income tax, it 
does not apply to a consumption tax.  The tax rate on marginal 
investment is zero in a cash-flow system.  There is, therefore, no reason 
to lower the rate to promote new investment. 
Rather than setting the corporate rate based on competitiveness 
or investment considerations, there are three much more modest 
efficiency considerations that need to be taken into account when 
setting the corporate rate.  The first is that a lower rate will reduce the 
size of the required currency price adjustments and the costs to firms 
if the adjustments are not complete and quick.  That is, a low corporate 
rate might alleviate the concerns many importing firms have about the 
required currency price adjustments.   
Second, and offsetting this, we may want a higher rate on 
economic profits.  Taxes on economic profits are to a great extent non-
distortive and, in some models, desirable.  Third, the tax rate affects 
the size of the transition tax, if any.  Although the effects depend on 
the transition rules, in general, a higher tax rate means a higher tax on 
existing capital on transition.   
Aside from these economic considerations, there are 
administrative reasons for setting the rate because of how it interacts 
with the tax on labor income and creates incentives to recharacterize 
income.  In a pure X-tax, the corporate rate is normally proposed to be 
set equal to the highest tax rate on labor income.  If the corporate rate 
is lower than the tax rate on labor earnings, there is an incentive to pay 
low salaries and to take the money out as corporate earnings.  Setting 
                                                      
45 Because the corporate tax applies to domestic consumption, it could 
affect the location of consumption.  The effects, however, will likely be very small.  
In particular, there may be an incentive to purchase and consume mobile and 
expensive items such as yachts and planes abroad to avoid a high U.S. tax, but it is 
not clear we should want to lower tax rates for all purchases because of these items. 
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the corporate tax rate equal to the marginal rate on labor income 
eliminates the benefit of recharacterizing wages as corporate earnings. 
Because the Brady plan has the additional tax on dividend 
income, however, equalizing the rates may no longer be desirable for 
preventing recharacterization of earnings.  Instead, setting the 
corporate rate below the highest wage rate may be the right strategy.  
In particular, (1) conditional on deciding that we want a tax on 
dividends and other capital income at half of the rate applicable to 
wages and salaries, and (2) given that the corporate tax rate itself has 
few economic effects (as just argued), then (3) we might want to set 
the corporate rate to eliminate the incentive to recharacterize earnings 
as either salary or as dividends, which means (4) because of the tax on 
dividends, the corporate rate that achieves this goal will be below the 
tax rate on wages and salaries.   
To illustrate, suppose that the Brady plan rate structure 
followed the standard X-tax approach and set the tax rate on corporate 
cash flow equal to the highest marginal tax rate on wages: the wage 
rate and corporate tax rate are both 33% and the tax rate on dividends 
is half of that or 16.5%.  Suppose that a worker-owned corporation has 
a $100 receipt which it wants to distribute.  Because the worker and 
the owner are the same, the money can equally be distributed as salary 
or as a dividend.   
If the corporation pays the $100 as salary, the owner pays $33 
in tax, leaving him with $67.  If it pays the money as a dividend, the 
corporation would owe $33 in tax and the owner would pay an 
additional $11.06 in dividend taxes for a total of $44.06 in taxes, 
leaving the owner with $54.04, which is less than if the money were 
paid as salary.  There would be an incentive to pay out earnings as 
salary.   
A 20% corporate rate, as in the Brady plan, eliminates this 
incentive.  If the corporation were to pay out the $100 as earnings, it 
would owe $20 in tax and the owner would pay an additional $13.20 
in tax due to the 16.5% rate on dividends, leaving him with $66.80, 
which is effectively the same as if the earnings were paid out as salary.  
The relative rates in the Brady plan, therefore, are set consistently with 
the goal of eliminating the incentive to recharacterize earnings.   
The major problem with the relative tax rates in the Brady plan 
is the special cap on tax rates for pass-through entities.  As argued 
above, the best approach would be to eliminate the pass-through 
regime, but if it is to be retained, the tax rate cap should be eliminated.  
The reason is that the tax rate cap for pass-throughs creates obvious 
avoidance opportunities (and has no efficiency benefits).   
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In particular, the tax rate cap for pass-through income creates 
an incentive to recharacterize wage and salary income as pass-through 
income.  Owners of pass-through entities could do so by paying a 
below-market salary (taxed at 33%) and increasing the entity’s 
earnings (taxed at 25%).  Moreover, individuals who work for 
corporations could form pass-through entities which provide services 
to their employers in exchange for fees rather than having their 
employers pay them wages or salaries.  To the extent the fees can be 
characterized as pass-through income rather than wages or salaries, 
they will be taxed at a 25% rate rather than 33% rate.  To prevent this 
avoidance, the plan would require pass-through entities to pay 
reasonable compensation but this rule may be difficult to enforce.   
Abolishing the special rate will have few if any effects on 
investment but will eliminate incentive to recharacterize cash flows.  If 
both pass-through earnings and salary are taxed at a 33% rate, it will 
not matter whether a cash flow is characterized as earnings or salary.  
There would be no need for the reasonable compensation rule and no 
need to incur the expense of futilely attempting to enforce it.   
C. International Issues 
International taxation has the potential to be far simpler under 
a destination-based consumption tax than under an income tax.  The 
tax base under a destination-based consumption is domestic 
consumption.  Although not always straightforward, this concept is 
relatively well understood and has economic meaning.  It can be 
identified by the physical location of the individual engaging in the 
consumption. 
The tax base in an income tax is either worldwide income, 
income earned in a given territory, or a mix of the two.  The U.S. 
system, for example, might loosely be characterized as based on 
worldwide passive income and repatriated worldwide active income.  
The location of income (and related expenses), however, is not well 
defined.  There is no underlying economic reality.  As a result, the rules 
can be manipulated both through actual transactions and through 
relabeling items.  Capital is highly mobile and can be packaged in an 
almost infinite variety of investment vehicles to exploit the rules.  The 
rules are then made more complex to combat the avoidance, leading to 
yet additional more sophisticated avoidance.  Moreover, if different 
countries have different rules, taxpayers can take advantage of the 
differences.   
Even if we could define the location of income and even if 
countries agreed on the definition, the tax base has to be coordinated 
with other countries who may also claim to tax those same returns.  For 
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example, both the location where production takes place, the source 
country, and the location where the owner lives, the residence country, 
may want to tax the same income.   
The end result of all this is a Byzantine tax system and very 
wealthy tax planners.  Although it is surely the case that our current 
tax rules for international income can be improved, I do not think that 
any set of rules within an income tax would be simple and effective.  
The underlying concepts are ill-defined, and mobile capital makes it 
easy to exploit any problems.   
One of the main benefits of the Brady plan is its potential to 
simplify the international tax rules.46  Nevertheless, the international 
tax aspects of the plan, particularly border adjustments, have more 
attention than almost any other aspect.  Below I examine the problem 
of border adjustments and then turn to other international tax issues. 
Border adjustments 
Recall that the Brady plan includes border adjustments.  
Exports are not taxed, which means that an exporter will have domestic 
costs but no taxable cash flow on its sales, generating a net loss.  In 
our running example, if the retailer purchases the good for $70 and 
sells it abroad for $100, it does not include the $100 but may deduct 
the $70, generating $14 of tax savings.  This $14 of tax savings is the 
border adjustment.   
Imports are not deductible.  Importers will have taxable 
receipts when they sell their imports in the United States but will not 
have deductible costs, which means that the full value of goods when 
imported will be taxed.  If the retailer imported the good for $70 and 
sold it in the United States for $100, it would not be able to deduct the 
$70 but would be taxed on the $100.  For the moment, leaving aside 
the wage deduction and wage tax (which offset) the importer would 
owe $20, consisting of the $6 tax on the value it added in the United 
States and the $14 tax on the value of the good when imported.  The 
$14 tax on import is the border adjustment on import.  That is border 
adjustments are the $14 rebate on export for costs incurred in the 
United States and the $14 tax on import for value added abroad.   
                                                      
46 Note, however, that as discussed in Part IV.A., the Brady plan seems to 
retain many elements of an income tax (possibly inadvertently).  If these elements 
are part of the final legislation, many of the current law rules for taxation of 
international income would also have to be retained.  The vast simplification of 
international tax rules that comes with a consumption base requires consistent use 
of a consumption base. 
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As noted, economists believe that in equilibrium, a destination-
based system (i.e., a system with border adjustments) and an origin-
based system (one without border adjustments) are equivalent except 
for how they tax inframarginal returns and on transition.  As a result, 
notwithstanding much of the rhetoric surrounding border adjustments, 
a decision to have border adjustments should be made based on 
administrative considerations rather than a belief that one system or 
the other promotes U.S. businesses relative to foreign businesses.47  
To understand the administrative considerations, I list below 
the benefits and costs of having border adjustments.  After going 
through the costs and benefits, I provide an overall evaluation.   
The key benefit to border adjustments is that they reduce or 
even eliminate the transfer pricing problems of current law and that an 
origin-based consumption tax would face.  If the manufacturer in our 
running example sells the widget to a foreign retailer in an origin-based 
system, the sales price determines how much tax the manufacturer 
owes.  If the manufacturer sells the widget to the retailer for $50 (when 
its fair market value was $70), it eliminates $20 from its tax base.  If 
the manufacturer and the retailer are commonly owned, there is no 
economic cost to lowering the price, generating the transfer pricing 
problem.  With a destination-based system, the sale to the foreign 
retailer is not taxed regardless of the price, so there is no transfer 
pricing problem.  A similar logic holds for imports: in an origin-based 
system, raising the price of an import reduces the U.S. tax base while 
in a destination-based system, it has no effect.  
Eliminating transfer pricing problems is a substantial benefit.  
Recent estimates are that by 2012, the United States was losing 
between $77 and $110 billion annually due to transfer pricing 
manipulation.48  This is a large sum by any measure.  Moreover, it does 
not include the planning costs, such as paying lawyers, accountants, 
and bankers, and the economic distortions, such as the costs of 
relocating capital or individuals to increase the likelihood that transfer 
prices will be respected.   
                                                      
47 If the United States is a net importer during the 10-year budget window, 
as is expected, border adjustments will be scored as raising revenue.  Although I 
have not seen any official revenue estimates, I understand that this revenue is being 
used to pay for other aspects of the plan.  Note, however, that to the extent that 
border adjustments are imposed at a time when the United States has a trade deficit, 
they lose rather than raise money in present value terms.  Any claim that border 
adjustments raise money is due to an artifact in the scoring rules.  
48 Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate 
Tax Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J.  905, 905-34 (2016).   
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A second potential benefit of border adjustments is that they 
eliminate the incentives seen in origin-based systems for tax 
competition.  In particular, in an origin-based system, countries have 
an incentive to lower tax rates to attract businesses that have mobile, 
source-based, inframarginal returns.  This incentive goes away with a 
destination-based tax because the location of production has no effect 
on the level of the tax.   
There are three key of costs of a destination-based system.  The 
first, which is unique to an X-tax structure like the Brady plan, is that 
border adjustments under such a structure may be contrary to WTO 
law.  The problem can be thought of as one of substance versus form.  
If the income tax elements of the corporate tax discussed above, such 
as the non-deductibility of land and inventory are eliminated, the 
substance of the Brady plan with border adjustments is entirely 
consistent with WTO law.49  It is effectively the same as destination-
based tax systems used throughout the world.  The form, however, may 
be inconsistent with WTO law.  The legal question is whether a WTO 
panel would follow the substance or the form of the law.   
The “form” problem is that under the WTO Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement, a tax can be border adjustable 
only if it is an “indirect” tax and not if it is a “direct” tax.  A direct tax 
is a tax on “wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms 
of income.” An indirect tax includes a VAT and all taxes other than 
direct tax.  Moreover, border adjustments for an indirect tax are 
allowed only if they do not exceed the amount of indirect tax levied on 
like products when sold for domestic consumption.  I interpret this 
latter requirement as a requirement that border adjustments are 
accurate: rebates on exports cannot exceed previously imposed taxes 
and taxes on imports cannot exceed taxes that would be imposed 
domestically. 
The Brady plan and similar plans like the X-tax, look like a 
VAT, which is an indirect tax, except that they have a deduction for 
wages at the business level and tax wages to individuals.  The question 
is whether this treatment of wages makes the Brady plan a direct tax.  
There seems to be little or no jurisprudence giving further meaning to 
these terms, and there are no tax systems like the Brady plan or the X-
tax to use as a comparison.  Many commentators, however, believe 
that the best reading of these terms is that the Brady plan would be a 
direct tax, ineligible for border adjustments. 
                                                      
49 If these elements are retained, it is hard to see how border adjustments 
would be consistent with the WTO.  
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One reason why commentators believe that the Brady plan 
would be a direct tax is that because of the wage deduction, border 
adjustments would be inaccurate.  They could exceed the indirect tax 
levied on like products when sold domestically.  Although the 
accuracy requirement is distinct from the “indirect” requirement, the 
two are likely related: the inaccuracy of the border adjustments arises 
because the tax is not purely at the business level.   
To illustrate why border adjustments would be inaccurate, 
consider our retailer who sells the widget for $100 to a foreign 
consumer.  The retailer deducts $70 and gets a rebate of $14.  The 
manufacturer that sold the good to the retailer, however, has a tax base 
of only $20: it has $70 of receipts and $50 of labor costs.  It pays a tax 
of $4.  The $50 of labor costs are taxed to the wage earners.  The wage 
earners, however, do not necessary pay $10 in tax.  Depending on their 
rates, they may pay more than that or less.  If they pay less, the 
retailer’s border adjustment of $14 exceeds the taxes paid at prior 
levels of production.  Moreover, because only indirect taxes count 
when computing accuracy, and because the wage tax is not an indirect 
tax, there has only been a $4 indirect tax on the good even though the 
rebate is $14, clearly violating the accuracy requirement. 
This argument, however, is purely formal rather than 
substantive because we can just change the labels without changing 
the tax that is levied and make the system unquestionably legal.  
Suppose that instead of giving businesses a deduction for wages and 
salaries and taxing workers on their wages and salaries, we instead 
imposed a normal VAT, with no deduction for wages.  Wage income 
would then be taxed at the flat VAT rate rather than the desired 
progressive rates.  This VAT could clearly be border adjustable 
because it is an indirect tax and the border adjustment would be 
accurate.   
To make the taxation of wage income progressive, we can add 
a tax credit for low-income workers which offsets the VAT in the 
desired amounts, and, for high-income workers (if their marginal tax 
rate on wages exceeds the VAT rate), impose a tax on those wages to 
make up the difference.  For example, if the VAT rate is 20% and we 
want high-wage earners to pay 33%, we could impose a tax rate of 
16.25% on their wages.  The corporation would pay them $80 after 
paying the 20% tax.  A 16.25% tax on the $80 of wages would be $13, 
so the total tax would be $33, or 33% as desired.  Similarly, we could 
offer low-wage workers a credit, such as an expanded earned income 
tax credit or an offset to payroll taxes, to give them the required 
combined tax rate.  This labor income tax/credit system would be 
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entirely separate from the VAT.  It would, therefore, not affect the 
border-adjustability of the VAT.  It is simply a separate, progressive 
wage tax.   
This is how European systems work.  They have flat rate, 
border-adjustable VATs and separate progressive income taxes.  
Under the X-tax and the Brady plan, the two systems are combined 
because of the wage deduction at the business level and matching 
inclusion to workers.  It is only because the two system are combined 
that there is an issue of WTO legality, but this is a mere formality 
rather than a substantive difference.   
The question, therefore, is whether the substance of the Brady 
plan should prevail or its form.  I am not sufficiently expert in WTO 
jurisprudence to have a view on the likelihood of success.  Some 
authors conclude that the border adjustments would not be allowed 
under the WTO rules, but these authors rely on the formal structure of 
the plan.50 To get a sense of the risks, it would be nice to have a better 
understanding of whether, and when, the WTO is able to look at the 
substance of a law rather than its formal rules.  There is nothing in the 
Brady plan that violates the substantive goals of the WTO.   
Rather than confronting the WTO and having to make legal 
arguments about substance versus form, we could simply adopt the 
VAT/wage tax structure suggested above.  For reasons that are unclear 
to me, however, actually adopting a VAT seems to be politically 
untenable even though, a just demonstrated, there is no economic 
difference between what is going proposed in the Brady plan and the 
modification just described. 
An alternative is to modify the labels in the Brady plan to 
increase the likelihood of compliance while not formally adopting a 
VAT.  For example, we could retain the current structure but require 
wage withholding at the corporate rate, rather than setting wage 
withholding based on each individual’s tax rate.  In our example, if 
wage withholding were mandatory and always at a 20% rate, the 
manufacturer in the example would have remitted $14 in tax, so the 
retailer’s rebate will match tax remittance at prior levels of production.  
In effect, corporations would be required to remit as taxes the same 
amount that they would remit under a VAT, without exception.  The 
                                                      
50 Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 4. 
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only difference is that a portion of the remittance is called a 
withholding tax rather than a corporate tax.51  
The second cost of border adjustments is the cost of uncertainty 
about currency adjustments.  Recall that the switch from current law 
to a destination-based system requires the dollar to appreciate.  
Consider for example, an importer who currently buys goods from 
abroad for $95 and sells them domestically for $100, making a $5 
profit.  Under current law, it can offset the $95 of costs against its $100 
receipts and pay tax on the net.  If the tax rate is 20%, the importer is 
left with $4.  With a destination-based system, it would not be able to 
deduct the $95 cost of import and it would owe $20 of tax on its $100 
receipt.  If nothing changed, the tax would greatly exceed its profits. 
The expectation is that the dollar would appreciate.  With a 
20% tax rate, the dollar would appreciate by 25%, so that the importer 
could purchase the good for $76.  If this happens, the importer would 
have $100 in receipts, pay a $20 tax and be left with a $4 after-tax 
profit.  If this happens completely and quickly, nobody would be worse 
for the wear.  The concern is that this will not happen quickly enough 
or completely.  Importers are reluctant to rely on economic models 
when their entire business is at stake. 
We have more than economic models, however, to give us 
confidence that the currency adjustments would, in fact, occur.  Every 
VAT in the world relies on these currency adjustments.  If they did not 
occur, importers in countries with VATs would face exactly the same 
problem that importers are worried about with the Brady plan.  There 
are good reasons to be confident in the currency adjustments. 
The real issue is transition.  If the adjustments are slow or 
uneven, importers could be hurt.  While the currency market is deep 
and liquid, so that one would expect the overall adjustments to be fast, 
some countries have their currencies pegged to the dollar or attempt to 
manage their currencies relative to the dollar.  These countries would 
have to repeg or change their dollar targets.  This might not happen 
                                                      
51 One cost of this approach is that withholding will be too high for low-
income workers. To the extent these workers may be cash constrained, withholding 
at too high a rate may not be viable. Fixing this problem could be done by reducing 
withholding for payroll taxes or allowing an advance rebate implemented through 
debit cards. Michael Graetz considered both in his tax proposal. MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND 
COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008). 
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instantly.52  Moreover, oil is traded in dollars, so currency adjustments 
will not affect the relative price of oil.   
Because I view the problem of currency adjustments as one of 
transition, I discuss mechanisms to ease the transition in Part IV.H., 
where I discuss transition issues more generally.  Note, however, that 
the risk of a rocky transition is a substantial cost of border adjustments.  
Incomplete or slow currency adjustments would be disruptive. 
The third problem with border adjustments is enforcement.  
VATs have experienced two enforcement problems with their border 
adjustments.  One is fake exports used to obtain tax rebates.  The Brady 
plan is not refundable, unlike most VATs, which reduces this problem.  
A second problem is avoidance of the tax on import.  This is a 
particular problem for intangibles such as purely electronic goods sold 
over the internet (e.g., software, videos, and computer games) and 
services provided from abroad (e.g., accounting or legal services 
provided remotely).  To tax these items, we would need to impose a 
20% excise tax on their purchase.  Collecting such a tax may be 
difficult, and evasion levels may be high.  One central problem with 
collecting an excise tax on import is that remote sellers do not have a 
permanent establishment in the United States, so imposing the tax on 
sellers may not be feasible.  Imposing the tax on purchasers, which is 
what states try to do, ineffectively, with use taxes, would also not be 
simple.   
One can weigh these costs and benefits differently.  For 
example, the weight given to the WTO problems may depend on your 
reading of WTO law, views on the consequences of an adverse ruling, 
and the feasibility of modifying the plan to reduce the risk of an 
adverse ruling.  Importers naturally heavily weigh the risk of slow or 
incomplete currency adjustments. 
My overall view, which I hold weakly rather than strongly, is 
that I believe it is worth having border adjustments.  The WTO 
problem and currency adjustments are one-time problems – serious 
ones to be sure – that with careful management can likely be overcome.  
Relabeling taxes can reduce the formal problem with compliance with 
the WTO without changing the substance of the tax law.  Transition 
rules can reduce the risk of slow or incomplete currency adjustments.  
Transfer pricing is a permanent problem.  I would rather try to get over 
                                                      
52 Perhaps one should not underestimate the ability of people or countries 
to be irrational, but it is hard to see a reason for not repegging or retargeting.  
Moreover, failing to repeg or retarget would impose tremendous economic pressure 
on these countries. 
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the one-time problems to fix a serious and growing problem that will 
last indefinitely.   
 
Other international tax issues: treaties and creditability 
Countries that impose world-wide taxation on domestic 
companies typically allow the companies to claim a foreign tax credit 
for income taxes paid abroad.  Credits are restricted to income taxes, 
which means that taxed paid under the Brady plan may not be 
creditable.  Some have suggested that this may be a problem. 
It is not clear, however, how big the problem would be because 
the net present value tax in a cash-flow system is zero.  The initial 
reduction in credits when an investment is expensed exactly offsets the 
increase in credit from the U.S. tax on the return.  There would be no 
need for a crediting system because there is no net tax.   
Separately, the business portion of the Brady plan might not 
qualify as an income tax under our existing network of treaties because 
the base is consumption.  VATs, for example, do not quality as income 
taxes for treaty purposes.   
Treaties are important to U.S. businesses investing abroad 
because they provide relief from foreign withholding taxes, scale back 
the tax reach of foreign countries, and prevent discriminatory 
treatment of foreign investment.  Foreign businesses, in return, receive 
similar benefits when investing in the United Sates. 
The question is whether foreign nations will find it in their self-
interest to continue their treaty relationships under the Brady plan.  
Because it eliminates U.S. source-based taxation, the Brady plan may, 
by statute, give foreign investors many of the benefits they currently 
receive by treaty.  As a result, treaty partners may not see any need to 
give up any of their source tax revenues, and, therefore, not see any 
need to continue their treaties with the United States.   
Foreign nations will have to make the determination of whether 
they wish to continue their treaty relationships with the United States.  
In the meantime, the United States should continue to treat the treaties 
as applying.  Moreover, the plan should maintain the withholding tax 
on dividends, so that if a foreign nation terminates their treaty with the 
United States, the full withholding tax would apply, thereby creating 
an incentive for foreign nations to continue to treat the treaty as 
binding.  Because of treaty nondiscrimination provisions, the United 
States may not be allowed to impose a withholding tax with treaty 
countries.  If a country were to terminate its treaty with the United 
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States, the withholding tax would kick in, creating an incentive not to 
terminate the treaty.53  
D. Financial Flows 
The plan as written distinguishes between interest expense and 
payments on real assets.  If it were fully R-based, it would distinguish 
financial flows from real flows.  Regardless of which approach is 
taken, making these distinctions will generate a number of problems.54  
Interest v. other payments 
Suppose that the plan only disallowed net interest deductions 
but otherwise taxed financial flows, which is how the current draft 
reads.55  The plan would then need rules to determine when a flow is 
“interest” instead of something else.  This problem exists under current 
law but would be worse under the Brady plan because the 
consequences of being labeled interest would be more severe. 
To illustrate, suppose that a business wanted to borrow $100 at 
a 10% interest rate for one year.  If it used a financial instrument 
formally labeled debt to borrow the $100, the $10 of interest that it 
pays would be non-deductible.  Suppose instead that it borrowed the 
following way: it sells short $100 of Treasury securities and 
simultaneously enters into a forward contract to purchase Treasury 
securities in one year for $110.  The cash flows on this second 
transaction are identical to the flows on formal borrowing.  The 
second, however, uses the form of the sale and purchase of securities 
rather than of a debt instrument.   
The combined sale and repurchase might be recharacterized as 
a borrowing because the flows precisely match those of a borrowing.  
If so, however, it would be straightforward to make the flows 
mismatch one another to avoid recharacterization but without 
changing the economics significantly.   
There will be no easy way around this problem.  Any set of 
flows where payments come in before they go out has implicit interest.  
Absent an attempt to impute interest to all flows, there will be ways to 
hide interest expense in real or other financial flows and generate 
deductions for what is economically interest expense.   
Real v. financial flows 
                                                      
53 See Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implications 
of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT’L. TAX J. 619, 642 (1995). 
54 For additional detail, see, Chapter 6 in CARROLL AND VIARD, supra note 
16, at 81-101.  
55 As discussed above, I am assuming that to the extent the plan taxes 
financial flows, it does so on an income tax basis, not a cash-flow basis.  
216 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:171 
 
 
Suppose instead that the Brady plan were to take the more 
conventional approach used in VATs and in X-tax proposals and 
ignored all financial flows.  Under this approach, the tax system would 
have to distinguish financial flows from real flows.  Many transactions, 
however, have elements of both.   
A typical case is the sale of a good on credit.  For example, 
suppose a retailer sold a good with a fair market value of $100 to a 
customer and the customer agreed to pay $110 in one year’s time.  If 
interest income is not taxed but sales proceeds are, the retailer will 
want to characterize the transaction as producing a $100 real inflow 
(which is taxable) and a $10 interest receipt (which is not taxable).  If 
the value of the good cannot be readily determined, the retailer will 
have an incentive to overstate the interest, for example, by claiming 
the value of the good is only $95 and there is $15 of non-taxable 
interest income, reducing the tax base by $5. 
Problems would also arise with transactions such as forward 
contracts that can be either cash settled or physically settled.  For 
example, suppose that a corporation entered into a contract for the 
purchase of a unit of pork bellies in one year’s time for $100.  If pork 
bellies went up in price over the course of the year, the corporation 
would have a gain on the transaction.  In this case, it could cash settle 
the contract and report it as an excludible financial flow.  If pork bellies 
went down in price, the corporation would have a loss, and it could 
physically settle the contract, reporting a deductible loss.  If the other 
side of the contract is a taxable entity, its incentives would be the flip, 
so that any tax advantage to one party is a disadvantage to the other.  
If, however, the other side were not taxed or were taxed differently 
than the corporation (say because it is a financial institution using a 
special regime for financial institutions), their incentives might not 
offset.   
The underlying problem is that there is no economic distinction 
between real and financial flows.  The distinction is a tax distinction.  
Nevertheless, VATs around the world draw this line, so there is 
substantial experience with the problems that arise.  Solutions used in 
VATs should be considered for the Brady plan.   
Financial institutions 
Regardless of which approach is taken, the system will have a 
problem taxing financial institutions.  Suppose that all financial 
transactions are ignored.  Financial institutions buy and sell (or issue) 
securities and other financial instruments, incurring labor and capital 
costs to do so.  If financial flows are ignored, all they would have 
would be deductible costs for labor and physical capital (such as 
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buildings and computers).  They would generate losses every year even 
if they are wildly profitable.   
Financial institutions are a substantial portion of the U.S. 
economy.  They include commercial and investment banks, property, 
casualty, and life insurance and reinsurance companies, securities 
brokers and dealers, mutual funds, market makers, and traders such as 
hedge funds.  All of these entities would be effectively untaxed, or 
even generate net losses, in a pure R-based system.   
An R-based tax system will need a special regime for the 
taxation of financial institutions.  A likely candidate is to tax financial 
institutions on all flows (other than with respect to stock), both real 
and financial.56  This system is known as an R+F system and was 
original devised by a UK tax reform commission known as the Meade 
Commission.57 Like a cash-flow system on ordinary businesses, an 
R+F system taxes economic profits and, depending on the transition 
rules, existing capital.   
Putting financial institutions on an R+F basis requires a 
definition of financial institutions.  This will not be straightforward 
both because of the wide variety of financial institutions and because 
ordinary businesses may engage in a large number of financial 
transactions (such as lending to customers and hedging their risk) so 
that it may sometimes be difficult to tell when a business is a financial 
institution.   
E. Corporate Transactions 
The current income tax has a substantial body of law governing 
corporate transactions such as mergers, stock acquisitions, and 
corporate divisions.  These rules were developed within an income tax 
and would need to be rethought if the corporate tax base is 
consumption. 
Consider a corporation that has assets valued at $100 and has a 
basis in the assets of, say, $70.  Under current law, if it were to sell all 
of its assets to another corporation, it would, without special 
provisions, owe a tax on its $30 of gain.  If, however, the asset sale is 
done just the right way – meeting an endless list of seemingly arbitrary 
rules – the reorganization provisions of current law allow the 
corporation to avoid paying tax on its gain.  Instead, the gain is 
transferred to the buyer by giving the buyer a $70 basis in the assets 
rather than a basis equal to its purchase price of $100.  Similarly, if the 
                                                      
56 For a discussion, see Peter Merrill & Chris Edward, Cash-flow Taxation 
of Financial Services, 49 NAT’L. TAX J. 487 (1996). 
57 INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, supra note 10, at 230-245.  
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corporation were to spin off the assets by incorporating them and 
distributing the stock of the new corporation to its shareholders, special 
rules, with yet more complex and arbitrary requirements, allow the 
spin-off to defer taxation.   
In a consumption tax system, there is, by operation of the 
system and without special rules, no net tax on the sale of the assets 
from one business to another.  In the example, the selling business 
would have a taxable inflow of $100 and the buyer would have a 
deductible outflow of $100, netting to zero.  There is no need for the 
reorganization rules. 
Moreover, even if desired, there would be no easy way to retain 
the equivalent of the reorganization rules in a cash-flow system.  The 
current rules operate by not taxing the target corporation and not giving 
the buyer basis for its costs.  Instead, the buyer inherits the target’s 
basis.  There is, however, no concept of basis in a cash-flow system.  
Not taxing the seller and not allowing the buyer a deduction does not 
achieve the same thing as the current law reorganization rules unless 
there is some way to shift the equivalent of basis – the deduction the 
seller had when it purchased its assets – to the buyer.  In particular, in 
an income tax, we shift the capitalized cost of the seller’s assets to the 
buyer by transferring the seller’s basis to the buyer.  With a cash flow 
system this would be very difficult because there is no basis.  The seller 
will have deducted the $70 when the assets were purchased, which 
could have been many years ago.  In fact, taxing the sale to the buyer 
and giving the seller a deduction can be thought of as the consumption 
tax equivalent of the reorganization rules because this treatment 
effectively shifts the prior deduction to the new owner of the assets in 
the same way that the income tax rules shift the basis. 
There are two other effects of the reorganization rules under 
current law.  The first is that they allow shareholders to defer taxation 
of gains when they exchange their shares of a target corporation for 
the shares of a purchasing corporation.  Because the Brady plan retains 
the individual-level income tax, the rules would continue to matter for 
shareholders.  It is not clear, however, why it is desirable to allow 
shareholders to exchange stock in one company for stock in another 
without paying tax.  Moreover, even if one could identify 
circumstances when it is desirable to allow shareholders to defer 
taxation, it is unlikely that those circumstances would be anything like 
the cases allowed under current law.  And finally, with a low tax rate 
on capital income, there is little reason to have complex rules that 
allow deferral.   
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The other effect of the reorganization rules is that they allow 
corporate tax attributes such as net operating losses and unused tax 
credits to be transferred from the buyer to the seller.  If asset sales were 
fully taxable under the Brady plan, tax attributes would not transfer 
from target corporations to purchasers.  If the target were to liquidate, 
moreover, the attributes might disappear.  Structuring the same 
transaction as a stock purchase would mean that the attributes would 
remain with the target corporation and potentially be usable by the 
purchasing corporation via consolidation.  The result would be a 
difference between stock transactions and asset transactions.   
Given that asset purchases in a cash-flow system do not 
generate net tax, the key effects of reorganization rules would be to 
defer shareholder gain – something I view as undesirable – and to 
reduce the disparities between asset sales and stock sales with respect 
to the carryover of attributes.  Given how much less is at stake, the best 
approach, in my view, is to make all corporate transactions taxable and 
all exchanges of shares taxable, with perhaps an exception for 
recapitalizations.  Attributes would carry over in stock transactions but 
not asset transactions.  Alternatively, greatly simplified rules could be 
adopted to allow attributes to be transferred.  For example, attributes 
could be transferred in any transaction in which two companies merge 
or in which one purchases substantially all of the assets of another 
(regardless of the consideration).  All the other ornate concepts of the 
current law reorganization rules could be eliminated.   
The same arguments apply to the rules governing contributions 
to corporations.  These rules rely on shifting the basis of assets to the 
corporation.  Without a basis system, these rules may no longer make 
sense.  Moreover, in this case, there is no attribute transfer under 
current law, so special attribute transfer rules would not be needed. 
The rules defining dividends will also likely need to be revised.  
The current rules determine whether a distribution is a dividend by 
whether it comes out of corporate earnings and profits.  The earnings 
and profits account is determined on an income basis.  While an 
income-based earnings and profits account could be retained, doing so 
would mean that for tax purposes, corporations must compute both 
income and consumption tax bases and would require retention of 
many income tax rules.   
An alternative would be to compute earnings and profits on a 
cash-flow basis.  If this approach were taken, it would only make sense 
to use a cumulative account rather than the current approach of looking 
to a current account (and then a cumulative account).  To illustrate, 
suppose that a corporation purchases an asset for $100 in year 1 and 
220 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:171 
 
 
receives $110 in year 2.  On a cumulative basis, it has $10 of earnings 
which would support a $10 dividend.  Looking only at year 2 (so 
looking at the current earnings and profits account, which is what 
current law does) would give the corporation $110 of earnings, which 
would then produce a $110 dividend, which is far excess of any 
measure of corporate earnings. 
The current corporate tax system also has a number of rules 
designed to prevent losses from being transferred.  For example, if a 
corporation changes control, it may be limited in its ability to use 
losses in the future.  With a cash flow system, however, losses will be, 
for the most part, freely transferable simply because of the way a cash-
flow system works.  Consider a company with a $100 net operating 
loss.  The company can transfer the loss simply by selling a $100 asset.  
The selling company will have $100 of taxable receipts, which it can 
use against the loss and the purchasing company will have a $100 
deduction, effectively transferring the loss.   
The Brady plan allows indefinite carryforward with interest, so 
the incentive to transfer losses will be reduced as compared to current 
law.  On the other hand, under a destination-based cash-flow system, 
some businesses may be unlikely to be able to use losses for the 
indefinite future even if they are profitable.  In these cases, incentives 
to transfer losses may remain.  Given that loss transferability is built 
into the structure of the system, it may not be desirable to try to retain 
the current rules against loss transfers. 
In short, one of the major simplification benefits of the Brady 
plan (if amended to consistently tax consumption) would be to revise 
and repeal most of the provisions governing major corporate 
transactions.  (And if the pass-through regimes are repealed, the Brady 
plan could eliminate those rules as well.) These rules are not 
mentioned in the current draft plan.  As the plan progresses, this 
simplification opportunity should be taken.   
F. Deferral 
The Brady plan taxes dividends, interest, and capital gains 
received by individuals at a rate equal to half of the tax rate applicable 
to other income.  I assume, although the plan is silent, that the reduced 
rate also applies to flows from similar investments, such as from 
futures and forward contracts, swaps, options, and other financial 
instruments as well as non-business investments in property such as 
speculation in land, minerals, and collectibles.   
Combining this tax on capital income with a cash-flow 
business-level tax may be challenging.  The reason is that capital 
investments at the business level bear no tax (because of the cash flow 
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system).  As a result, funds can be retained at the business level until 
needed for consumption, at which point they would be withdrawn and 
taxed.  The effect is elective deferral of capital income, allowing 
capital income to grow tax free during the period of deferral. 
The Bush tax commission’s Growth and Investment plan had 
the same problem.  They suggested that one or more of current law’s 
anti-deferral regimes would be needed, but provided no details on how 
such a system would work.  A serious problem with applying these 
regimes is that they will not be able to apply to funds that are genuinely 
invested in a business.  They try to find “sham” investments, or 
incorporated pocketbooks, where individuals use shell corporations to 
hold funds and get deferral without really investing in active 
businesses.  In the Brady plan, however, the tax rate on marginal 
investments is zero, so if funds are genuinely invested in a business, 
the marginal tax rate on the investment will be zero.  Anti-abuse rules 
that disallow the zero marginal rate would be contrary to the basic 
structure and intent of the tax system.   
I do not see an easy solution to this problem.  There is a basic 
conflict in the plan between having a cash-flow tax at the business 
level and a tax on capital income at the individual level.  The following 
approaches might reduce the problem it to some extent: 
• Eliminate stepped-up basis at death.  The plan repeals the 
estate tax but does not mention stepped-up basis at death.  
Proposals to repeal the estate tax are often accompanied by 
repeal of stepped-up basis at death.  Getting rid of stepped up 
basis at death reduces the advantage of deferral. 
• Lower the tax rate on capital income even further.  The current 
plan imposes a top tax rate of 16.5% on capital income.  If the 
rate is even lower, the incentive to plan to get deferral 
correspondingly goes down.  (To retain progressivity, other 
rates would have to be adjusted.) 
• Impose a mark-to-market regime for publicly-traded securities 
at a low tax rate.   
• Instead of a mark-to-market regime, impose a regime that is 
economically equivalent to a mark-to-market regime, such as 
a system that imputes income based on an assumed return.   
The only one of these solutions that really solves the problem 
is a mark-to-market regime or an equivalent.  If such a system is not 
feasible, the best alternative might be to abandon the tax on capital 
income at the individual level and instead adopt a pure X-tax.  The 
Bush commission studied (but did not propose) a pure X-tax.  They 
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showed that a pure X-tax can be distributionally and revenue neutral, 
so there is little need for the additional tax on capital at the individual 
level.  The tax on capital income creates terrible enforcement problems 
and will distort behavior as people seek to avoid it.  Moreover, to the 
extent it can be enforced, it is inefficient relative to a pure consumption 
tax (for, apparently, no distributional benefit). 
G. Other Individual Tax Provisions 
The Brady plan indicates that it may revise many of the 
provisions that affect the tax liability of individuals, including the 
mortgage interest deduction, the charitable deduction, the retirement 
savings provisions, and the exclusion of employer provided health 
insurance.  To a great extent, the choices made with respect to these 
provisions are independent of the consumption tax structure of the 
plan.  Each raises complex issue that may have large effects on the 
relevant sectors of the economy.  Because the choices for these 
provisions are largely orthogonal to the structural issues raised by the 
Brady plan and because the choices are so complex, I do not discuss 
these issues here, except for following three brief points. 
First, if interest income is taxed at the individual level at half 
the individual tax rate and mortgage interest is deductible at the full 
rate, there will be an obvious arbitrage: increase the size of your 
mortgage and invest the funds in debt instruments.  Interest received 
will be taxed at half the rate interest is deducted, generating net tax 
losses for no real activity.   
The same concern applies to investment interest expense.  If 
investment interest expense is fully deductible but interest income is 
taxed at only half that rate, there are obvious arbitrages.  The plan 
makes clear that net interest expense is not deductible for businesses 
but says nothing about individuals and investment interest expense.   
Second, the plan eliminates the state and local tax deduction 
(as well as other itemized deductions other than home mortgage 
interest and charitable donations).  There is a substantial literature on 
the merits of the state and local tax deduction.58  A decision to repeal 
it will have important effects on the structure of local government and 
deserves careful consideration.   
Third, the plan seems to retain payroll taxes.  For many 
families, payroll taxes are the dominant tax.  They are also currently 
about one-third of federal taxes.  When we think about the tax rates 
                                                      
58 For example, Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of 
Federal Tax Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. 
ECON. 710 (1987). 
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applicable to wage income, we need to add in payroll taxes.  For 
example, payroll taxes may alter the incentives to recharacterize 
capital income as wage income or vice versa.   
H. Transition 
The Brady plan says nothing about the transition to the new 
system other than it will provide clear rules “to serve as an appropriate 
bridge from the current tax system to the new system.” The transition 
to a consumption tax, however, is one of the most important and most 
difficult aspects of consumption taxation.  The literature on transition 
is massive, and I can only touch on key points here.59 
Basic economics of transition 
The transition to a consumption tax is often said to impose a 
tax on existing capital.  There are two ways to see why.  The first is 
definitional: existing capital is a source of consumption.  If you have 
money in the bank, you can withdraw it and buy things.  Therefore, if 
the tax is to be on all consumption, it must be on existing capital.   
The second is transactional.  Suppose that we have an income 
tax and that you own an asset worth $100 that you purchased for $100.  
Under the income tax, you would have a basis in the asset of $100 and 
if the income tax remained in place, you could sell the asset for $100 
without tax.  Suppose that at midnight tonight, we switch to a cash-
flow consumption tax in which all purchases are deductible and all 
inflows are taxed.  Under this system, there is no tax basis.  The full 
amount of any inflow is taxed.  The next day, you sell your $100 asset.  
You have a $100 inflow, which would be fully taxed.  The cash-flow 
tax effectively taxes all existing capital when the capital is sold and 
used for consumption. 
Whether this is desirable is not a matter of definitions or 
transactional rules.  The question is whether it has desirable efficiency 
or distributional effects.  The argument that it is efficient is that if the 
switch is unanticipated, the tax on existing capital is lump sum.  Of 
course, transition would almost surely be anticipated, so people will 
take steps to avoid it, such as by accelerating their consumption to be 
before transition and deferring investments to be after transition.  
Moreover, if the new consumption tax has loopholes, there will be 
incentives to use those loopholes to avoid the tax on existing capital.  
Nevertheless, while the tax may not be lump sum, it may be reasonably 
efficient.  A tax on transition on existing capital would also have 
                                                      
59 For a survey of the literature, see Louis Kaplow, Capital Levies and 
Transition to a Consumption Tax, in INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE 112 (Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Shaviro eds., 2008). 
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desirable distributional properties because most existing capital is held 
by wealthy individuals. 
On the other hand, a tax on existing capital will likely raise 
vociferous objections.  Going back to the example, you bought the 
$100 asset with after-tax cash – that is why you have basis in the asset.  
If you are asked to pay tax again on the $100, you will surely object, 
even if the tax is under a new system.   
Existing basis 
The reason cash-flow systems tax (or can tax) existing capital 
is because after the transition date, they ignore basis that was created 
under the now-repealed income tax.  In the example given above, you 
had a $100 basis in your asset before the transition.  After the 
transition, when you sold your asset for $100, you had a $100 cash 
inflow and could not use your income tax basis against the inflow 
because the new system does not use basis to compute tax liability.  
We can, therefore, think of the tax on existing capital as arising 
because basis under the income tax does not count under a 
consumption tax.   
The central issue on transition, therefore, is whether businesses 
can use their existing basis.  The extent to which businesses can use 
their existing basis determines the extent of transition relief or 
transition tax.  Giving transition relief by letting taxpayer use existing 
basis, however, means that it could be years or decades before the 
system is fully on a cash-flow basis.  Moreover, transition relief will 
be very expensive given the size of the existing capital base, which 
means that tax rates would have to be much higher than without 
transition relief.   
The Brady plan says nothing about this, although I think the 
best reading of the text is that businesses will continue to be able to 
use existing basis.  The text simply says that new investment will be 
expensed.   
The Bush tax commission tried to take a middle course.  They 
allowed businesses to continue to use their existing depreciation 
allowances but phased them out over five years.  For example, in the 
second year of the new tax, businesses would be able to use 80% of 
the basis that they could have used under an income tax, 60% in the 
third year, and so forth.  This approach reduces the extent of transition 
relief and also ensures that the income tax rules – basis and so forth – 
can be eliminated after five years rather than having to be retained 
indefinitely. 
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A way to generalize this system is to allow taxpayers to a 
recover fraction of their basis in all of their assets (not just depreciable 
assets) on a fixed schedule.  Taxpayers would have to declare (and 
document) their basis and then could recover it (or a fraction) over a 
set period of time unrelated to the sale of their assets.  This would allow 
any level of desired transition relief depending on the allowed fraction 
and would allow the system to move immediately to a cash flow basis, 
eliminating the need for income tax rules.  Alternatively, basis could 
remain attached to assets so that it can be used when assets are sold, 
but would decline over a set period of time.   
Tax rate changes 
The transition effects of a tax rate change are exactly the same 
as the transition effects from the initial introduction of a cash-flow tax.  
Consider the example of the $100 investment, and suppose, now, that 
the investment was made under a cash flow system when the tax rate 
was 20%.  The investment produced a $20 tax saving.  A year from 
now, the investment is sold for $110.  If the tax rate were still 20%, the 
tax due would be $22, which is the future value of the $20 of tax 
savings.  Suppose, however, that in the interim, the tax rate was 
increased to 30%.  The tax due would now be $33, $11 more than under 
the 20% tax.  This $11 ($10 in present value terms) is a 10% tax on 
existing capital.  It is a tax on existing capital equal to the tax increase 
of 10 percentage points.  The opposite holds if tax rates go down.  
Taxpayers will receive a subsidy on existing capital equal to the 
amount by which taxes go down.   
Transition relief is relatively easy for the switch from an 
income tax to a consumption tax because taxpayers can be allowed to 
continue to use their existing basis.  The problem is much more 
difficult once taxpayers are in a cash-flow system and tax rates change 
because there is no basis to use.  There is no straightforward way to 
provide transition relief.   
Failing to provide transition relief for tax rate changes, 
however, may make the system less efficient because there would be 
an incentive to time transactions to take advantage of rate changes.  In 
particular, if it is anticipated that rates will go up, there will be an 
incentive to accelerate consumption to avoid the transition tax.  If it is 
anticipated that rates will go down, there will be a corresponding 
incentive to delay consumption.  These timing effects are inefficient 
because the tax system is causing individuals to accelerate or defer 
their consumption.   
Most cash-flow tax proposals ignore this problem, implicitly 
denying any transition relief for tax rate changes.  To the extent we are 
226 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:171 
 
 
concerned about the transition effects, David Bradford proposed an 
economic equivalent to a cash flow system that uses basis, and, 
therefore, alleviates transition effects from tax rate changes.60  This 
system could be adopted if needed, although it is much more complex 
than a cash flow system.   
Interest deductions 
The plan would deny interest deductions.  While debt issued 
after the enactment of the plan can take this into account, debt issued 
previously cannot.  Denial of interest deductions on existing debt may 
make many loans non-economic, possible forcing creditors to 
restructure their debt, a process that may be expensive and difficult.  In 
the worst case, some creditors could be forced into bankruptcy.  Given 
the volume of outstanding loans, this is not a small problem.   
One possibility is to grandfather debt issued prior to the 
effective date of the law.  The problem with this approach is that debt 
can be outstanding for very long periods of time.  Treating old debt 
and new debt differently for long periods of time would be complex.  
Moreover, if old debt gets better treatment than new debt, businesses 
will have a tax incentive to keep old debt rather than issue new debt 
even economically this is not desirable.   
The Bush commission recommended a five-year phase-out of 
interest expense deductions, similar to their phase-out of depreciation 
deductions.  Under this approach, interest deductions on all debt, 
regardless of when issued, are reduced gradually.  The effect in each 
year would be the same as a 20% reduction in tax rates, and businesses 
have experienced tax rate changes of this size in the past without large 
disruptions.  The tax plan introduced by Devin Nunes in H.R. 4377 
(cited in the Brady plan) takes a similar approach.  This approach is 
preferable to grandfathering old debt because it means we do not have 
to have dual tax systems running indefinitely, which we would need if 
old debt were grandfathered. 
Border adjustments61 
As noted, it will be important to manage the transition to border 
adjustments so that importers are not adversely affected.  Recall the 
                                                      
60 David F. Bradford, Transition to and Tax-Rate Flexibility in a Cash-
Flow-Type Tax, 12 TAX POL. & ECON. 151 (1998). 
61 My focus here is limited to issues of implementation.  Note, however, 
that the currency price changes on transition to a destination basis may have 
substantial economic effects.  In particular, U.S. holdings of foreign assets would 
decline in value and foreign holdings of U.S. assets would appreciate.  Together, 
these changes would represent a net wealth loss to U.S. citizens. CARROLL AND 
VIARD, supra note 16 at 110-111, provide a discussion.  
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illustration used above: a firm that purchases goods from abroad for 
$95 and sells them domestically for $100.  Under current law, the firm 
would be taxed on its $5 profit.  The $95 purchase price would be 
effectively deductible against its $100 sale proceeds (through basis 
rather than a deduction but the effect is the same).  Under a destination-
based tax, the firm would no longer be able to deduct the $95 purchase 
price and would owe a tax on the full $100 sales proceeds.  The tax 
could easily exceed its profit.   
As noted, economists argue that currency prices will adjust so 
that the firm’s position remains unchanged.  For example, if the dollar 
appreciates, the firm could buy the same good for $76, pay a $20 tax 
and still be left an after-tax profit of $4 (which can be thought of as a 
$5 pre-tax profit less a 20% tax).  One immediate problem is that if the 
purchase contract is denominated in dollars, the price would not 
change when dollars appreciate.  This means that dollar-denominated 
purchase contracts would have to be renegotiated.  Like with debt 
instruments, renegotiation could take time so that a phase-in of border 
adjustments may be warranted.   
The Bush commission also argued for a phase-in of border 
adjustments.  The basic idea is that a small border adjustment induces 
only a small currency price effect.  If the currency price effect is slow 
or incomplete, the harm to importers is modest.  This idea is worth 
considering.  A problem is that currency markets may anticipate the 
phase-in and force the dollar to appreciate faster than the phase-in.  In 
this case, exporters would be hurt.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Implementing a tax system based on the Brady plan will 
present a substantial challenge.  Many implementation problems arise 
because nothing like this has ever been tried by a developed country, 
not to speak of in a country the size of the United States.  It is likely 
that over time, solutions to most issues will be found.  Given the 
substantial number of issues, however, it is naïve to think that the plan 
can be passed into law quickly.   
Some issues, such as correcting the treatment of land and 
inventory are straightforward.  Others, such as the elimination of the 
regimes for pass-through taxation and rules for major corporate 
transactions, are conceptually straightforward but will be involve more 
substantial changes to current law.  And others will be difficult.  
Among the most important and difficult issues are the following: 
• Deferral and the collection of the capital income tax on 
individuals. 
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• The legality of border adjustments and possible design 
changes to improve the odds of compliance with the GATT. 
• The treatment of financial institutions. 
• The treatment of businesses that consistently generate tax 
losses while making economic profits. 
• Distinguishing between real and financial flows, and making 
a consistent choice to have an R-based system (or an R+F 
system). 
• Transition. 
These issues do not have straightforward solutions and will 
need careful analysis as the legislative process moves forward. 
